Command Study 12, Chapter 5. Implications for the Future Page: 3
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Free World leaders recalled the well-known remark by Winston Churchill
that "Russia is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma" and questioned
whether these recent moves by the Soviet Union were prefatory to a genuine
thaw in the cold war or even possibly the end of it. Although the general con-
sensus is that the Soviets have made a change of some sort, students of the
Soviet Union hesitate to predict the exact direction which the change may take.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., formerly Professor of History at Harvard and Special
Assistant to President Kennedy, raises the question of whether current changes
in Soviet policy represent a pause in the cold war or a pivot in the implemen-
tation of modified cold war strategy. Another authority sees the strategic turn
of Khrushchev as the outcome of a series of failures which have more or less
required Soviet leaders to reappraise the international force structure. Other
observers state that Mr. Khrushchev is now using the tactics of detente to ob-
tain endorsement of a European status quo which he was unable to obtain through
blockade or nuclear blackmail. In January 1963, Mr. Khrushchev, at a meeting
of the East Berlin congress of the "Socialist Unity Party, " stated that the United
States unyielding determination in the Cuban Crisis caused him to abandon fur-
ther political agitation in the Berlin situation.
On the basis of past Communist performances, the Soviet detente, in its
present form, does not seem to justify unbound optimism over a prospective
conclusion of the conflict between Western democracies and international com-
munism. Lenin himself stated that all Communists must take a long view of
the terrain to be covered "in order not to get lost in the zigzags of history, "
or, as Stalin put it, "Every historical turn has its strategic plan which cor-
responds to its requirements and is adapted to its tasks. " In other words, basic
Communist dogma teaches that it is an essential requirement to employ tactical
flexibility and deception to throw the enemy off guard while keeping one's own
eye on the main goal- -Communist world revolution. In the words of Lenin,
"The strictest dedication to the ideas of communism must be combined with the
ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to 'tack', to make
agreements, zigzags, retreats, and so on. " Past experience and events clearly
show that Premier Khrushchev and the Central Committee of the Soviet Commu-
nist Party have diligently attempted to follow these prescripts in strategic
maneuvers calculated to steer the Communist movement safely from one his-
torical period to the next.
Similar turns in Soviet foreign policy were made by Lenin in 1921, by Stalin
in 1934 and 1935, and by the present Soviet regime in 1953 and 1954. Significantly,
Soviet foreign policy has taken turns in the past when Soviet leaders observed that
world conditions seemed to preclude further immediate ideological or territorial
expansion. Between Lenin's death and the beginning of the Second World War,
for example, territorial expansion apparently was not a part of Soviet strategy.
But, when the opportunities for expanded Communist power presented themselves
during the years 1939-1947, the Soviets ruthlessly demonstrated that expansion
and colonization were still as much a part of their policy as ever. Traditionally,
Communist policy undergoes tactical changes to accomplish a variety of strate-
gic purposes which are always a part of the Communist master plan of world
domination. Such changes might be used for consolidation of conquered terri-
tory, development of the domestic economic sector, strengthening military ca-
pabilities, increased attempts to divide political enemies, and expansion of sub-
versive activities in vulnerable areas of the world.3
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Air University (U.S.). Command Study 12, Chapter 5. Implications for the Future, pamphlet, May 1964; Robins Airforce Base, Georgia. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1010082/m1/11/?q=%22%22~1: accessed July 9, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.