Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 192
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GROWTH AND ACTION
how well the Japanese forces in China would observe
the surrender terms. . . . When it became obvious that
the armed Japanese would not be a problem beyond
the capabilities of the Chinese Armies to handle, re-
deployment was begun at once. . . . It is a matter
of deep regret that China has not yet been able to
achieve unity by peaceful methods. . . . The views
expressed a year ago by this Government are valid
today. . . . While avoiding involvement in . . .
[China's] civil strife, we will persevere with our pol-
icy of helping the Chinese people to bring about
peace and economic recovery in their country.
The draft constitution for China was com-
pleted on December 25, 1946 and was scheduled
to take effect one year later. During
China's the interim period the Social Dem-
new draft ocratic and Young China parties
constitution were to be given a role, although
subordinate, in the provisional gov-
ernment. General Marshall and Ambassador
Stuart were credited with having influenced the
Kuomintang to liberalize the basis of this consti-
tution. General Marshall made a report on his
mission to the American people upon his return
to the United States in January 1947.
GENERAL MARSHALL'S REPORT ON CHINA,
WASHINGTON, JANUARY 7, 1947: . . . the great-
est obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost
overwhelming suspicion with which the
General Chinese Communist Party and the
Kuomintang regard each other. . . .
Marshall The leaders of the Government are con-
reports on his vinced . . . that the Communist-ex-
mission to pressed desire to participate in a gov-
China, 1947 ernment . . . had for its purpose only a
destructive intention. The Communists
felt . . . that the Government was insincere . . . and
intended by coercion of military force and the action
of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party.
. . . On the side of the National Government . . .
there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have
been opposed . . . to almost every effort I have
made to influence the formation of a genuine coali-
tion government. . . . On the side of the Chinese
Communist Party there are . . . liberals as well as
radicals. . . . there is a definite liberal group among
the Communists, especially of young men who have
turned to the Communists in disgust at the corrup-
tion evident in the local governments-men who
would put the interest of the Chinese people above
ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology
in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Com-
munists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures
to gain their end. . . . They completely distrust the
leaders of the Kuomintang. . . . a very harmful andimmensely provocative phase of the . . . Communist
Party procedure has been in the character of its prop-
aganda . . . in the deliberate misrepresentation and
abuse of the action, policies, and purposes of our
Government. . . . the Nationalist Government pub-
licity agen-cy has made numerous misrepresentations,
though not of the vicious nature of the Communist
propaganda. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement
have been frustrated time and again by extremists ele-
ments of both sides. . . . irreconciliable groups within
the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of
their own feudal control of China, evidently had no
intention of implementing . . . [the agreements
reached in January 1946]. . . . the course which the
. . . Communist Party has pursued in recent months
indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compro-
mise. . . . The reactionaries in the Government have
evidently counted on substantial American support
regardless of their actions. The Communists . . . are
evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring
about the fall of the Government. . . . The salva-
tion . . . as I see it, would be the assumption of
leadership by the liberals in the Government and in
the minority parties. . . . Successful action on their
part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek would . . . lead to unity through good gov-
ernment. . . . It is unfortunate that the Communists
did not see fit to participate in the [National] As-
sembly, since the constitution that has been adopted
seems to include every major point that they wanted.
. . . Now that the form for a democratic China has
been laid down by the newly adopted constitu-
tion, practical measures will be the test....
Despite General Marshall's ending on a hope-
ful note, there appeared little chance that the
new constitution would be the answer to China's
problems. It was clear that the
American American effort to bring the two
effort to opposing sides together, General
reconcile - Marshall's mission, must be counted
opposing a failure. The United States would
factions in have to drop its program for uni-
China fails fying the Communists and the
Kuomintang. As an alternative,
stepped-up aid to Chiang Kai-shek to enable him
to defeat the Communists in the field and to
strengthen his hold on the domestic political
situation seemed the only choice.
General But such a course would be expen-
Wedemeyer sive, and the success of any program
sent to China which called for backing Chiang
by President had its debatable aspects. Partly to
Truman ascertain the possibilities of success
and partly as a check on other in-192
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/206/?q=%22~1%22~1: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.