Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 215
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THE UNITED STATES COMBATS COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST
patient with the failure or inability of UN allies
to supply larger forces for the Korean fighting.
They were doubtful about 'the wisdom of the ad-
ministration's policy in respect to Far Eastern
affairs-if they admitted that a policy existed at
all. They were frustrated by the apparent limita-
tions upon freedom of action in Korea-they
could not agree whether General MacArthur
should be restricted from bombing military objec-
tives in Manchuria. They were angered that high
taxes, onerous price control regulations, and in-
terferences with personal freedoms were not pro-
viding compensatory satisfactions in the form of
victories for the UN allies and distress to the
Soviet Union and its satellites. In brief, a majority
of the American people were fed up with the
whole affair by 1951 and could not see a way out
of their dilemma.
Into this atmosphere, and partially as a con-
tributing factor to its high humidity and obscu-
rity, was injected what became known as the Mac-
Arthur controversy. From time to
Development time in American history fiercely
of the partisan quarrels have influenced
MacArthur our foreign policy. In the spring of
controversy 1951, the proverbial man from
Mars would have wondered whether
the inhabitants of the United States could ever
again lay claim to the title "united." American
foreign policy-or the lack of it-was laid bare in
the press, debated on the radio, exposed in its
skeletal form before congressional committees,
and argued on street corners until every potential
enemy of the United States must have been able
to put his own estimate on the probable course,
strength, and temper of our future actions. And
every ally of the United States must have ques-
tioned the advisability of depending upon so
undecided and so mercurial a peoples as the
Americans. In the end nothing fundamental was
changed. A general, with qualities of greatness
and unfortunate blind spots, had apparently mis-
read the basic facts of American constitutional
government and was relieved of his command.
A president, limited in qualifications for his high
office but conscious of the prerogatives of that
office, had made an unpopular, if constitu-
tionally correct, decision and stuck to that
decision.The chronological facts of the MacArthur inci-
dent are not difficult to list, although to do so
here would require many pages. But to describe
and analyze all the factors surrounding the con-
troversy would engage the time and abilities of
many students and access to volumes of testimony,
classified records, personal correspondence, and
whole libraries of press and periodical comment.
The cardinal facts are these:
1. General MacArthur during the autumn of 1950
grew increasingly impatient with the limits im-
posed on him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff orders to
create a neutral zone short of the Yalu River
boundary between North Korea and Manchuria,
beyond which UN action would not be pursued.
2. President Truman, on December 6, 1950, issued a
general directive ordering all govern-
Fundamental meant officials not to deliver any speech,
press release or other public statement
concerning foreign policy without prior
beneath the clearance by the Department of State, or,
MacArthur if concerning military policy, by the
incident Department of Defense-and in either
case such clearance was to be communi-
cated to the President.
3. On March 24, 1951, General MacArthur issued a
call to the Communists to surrender saying that
he stood ready to confer in the field with enemy
commanders on terms for an end to the fighting.
This call was announced at the time the adminis-
tration was preparing a proposal for peace nego-
tiations to be submitted to our UN allies for
approval. The administration thereupon withdrew
its peace proposal on the ground that General
MacArthur had compromised its usefulness. Gen-
eral MacArthur later denied he had any knowl-
edge of the peace proposal, but other authorities
say he had known of it.
4. On April 5, 1951, Representative Joseph W. Mar-
tin, Republication leader in the House, released a
letter received from General MacArthur, dated
March 20, 1951, in which the General endorsed
Mr. Martin's statement that Chinese Nationalist
troops training on Formosa should be used in
Korea to fight the Reds. General MacArthur in
this letter also criticized the actions of diplomats
concerned with implementing American foreign
policy in the Far East.
5. President Truman, after consultation with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided to. remove General
MacArthur from UN command and from his
post as commander-in-chief in the Far East-
SCAP. His decision was reached on April 10, 1951
and made public early the next morning in a
statement from the White House.215
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/229/?q=%22~1%22~1&rotate=90: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.