Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 224
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GROWTH AND ACTION
reached rather serious proportions and require early
correction... .
On December 17th he and General MacArthur
held a lengthy conference at the home of Mr.
Dulles, but, while Korea was discussed, no revela-
tion of the conversations was made at the time or
later. There the Korean problem rested while the
new administration prepared to take over the
direction of government, and with it the responsi-
bility for foreign policy.
In his inaugural address on January 20, 1953,
President Eisenhower made only passing refer-
ences to the war in Korea. In his first message
to the Congress on the State of the Union, how-
ever, the new president devoted several para-
graphs to the subject.
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS ON THE STATE OF THE UNION,
WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 2, 1953: . . . This
war [in Korea] is, for Americans, the
President most painful phase of Communist ag-
Eisenhower's gression throughout the world. It is
Eisehowr's clearly a part of the same calculated
first "State of assault that the aggressor is simultane-
the Union" ously pressing in Indochina and in Ma-
message laya, and of the strategic situation that
manifestly embraces the island of For-
mosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there. The
working out of any military solution to the Korean
war will inevitably affect all these areas. The Ad-
ministration is giving immediate increased attention
to the development of additional Republic of Korea
forces. . . . Increased assistance to Korea . . . con-
forms fully to our global policies. . . . In June 1950
. . . the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed
both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to
insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of
operations against the Chinese Communist mainland.
This has meant . . . that the United States Navy
was required to serve as a defensive arm of Com-
munist China. . . . there is no longer any logic or
any sense in a condition that required the United
States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on
behalf of the Chinese Communists. . . . I am, there-
fore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no
longer be employed to shield Communist China. - - -
This order implies no aggressive intent on our part.
But we certainly have no obligation to protect a na-
tion fighting us in Korea....
Thus, the new administration took up where
the old left off-with the Korean truce talks still
deadlocked over the issue of prisoner exchange;
with the armies still arrayed against each otheron the peninsula and hostilities in a sort of sus-
pended animation; with the UN still unable to
effect a settlement. Only the relief of the Seventh
Fleet from the duty of patrolling the waters be-
tween the mainland and Formosa was a new
element in the situation. President Eisenhower's
action in withdrawing the fleet and "unleashing"
Chiang Kai-shek was hailed as an example of the
bold, dynamic approach to Far Eastern affairs
promised by the Republicans in the 1952 cam-
paign. Whether Marshal Chiang was in a posi-
tion to move against the mainland was not at
once evident. But he was now free to do so
without interference from the United States.
9. Building the Pacific Defense Program
As the United States entered more and more
deeply into Far Eastern affairs during and after
World War II, it became evident that defense ofPacific
defense
becomes
a necessity
with spread of
communismthe Pacific Ocean area would be
one of the major concerns of Amer-
ica for years to come. Just as the
problem of Western Europe and
the North Atlantic regions grew
acute in face of the threats of
the Rome-Berlin axis in the late
1930's, so the rise of Japan and theexpansion of that power threatened the peace of
the Pacific at the same period. Then, when these
menaces in the West and in the East were de-
stroyed by the victories of World War II, new
imperialistic designs-this time on the part of
Soviet Russia and world communism-once more
threatened the security of vast regions of the
globe.
We have seen how the United States met the
challenge in Europe with the creation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And we
have examined the steps taken by the United
States in the Far East to stop Communist aggres-
sion in Korea, to bring Japan back into a posi-
tion of equality and sovereignty, but this time
on the side of the free world, and to redress the
loss of China to the Reds. It remains for us now
to describe the measures taken by the United
States to prevent further inroads by the Commu-
nists in the Pacific Ocean area by means of a
series of mutual defense arrangements concluded
during 1951.224
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/238/?q=%22~1%22~1: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.