Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 237
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THE UNITED STATES COMBATS COMMUNISM IN THE FAR EAST
concrete could be accomplished, the
Secretary Communist delegation repudiated
Dulles the truce plans. Thereupon Gen-
works for a eral Bedell Smith accused the Reds
Southeast Asia of blocking a settlement in the Far
defense East.90 Meanwhile Secretary Dulles
alliance had been laying the groundwork
for a Southeast Asia defense alli-
ance. The British government appeared reluctant
to commit itself to the arrangements planned by
Mr. Dulles and some friction was reported de-
veloping between Sir Anthony Eden and Mr.
Dulles over the situation. Secretary Dulles, on
May 25th, had defined United States policy on
collective security in the hope of allaying British
fears.1 In the first two weeks of June, 1954, Mr.
Dulles made a series of important pronounce-
ments in which he further explained the Ameri-
can position on the Far East. Because of the sig-
nificance of these statements and addresses, ex-
cerpts from three of them are reproduced here.
The first was a statement made in Washington,
the second an address to a meeting of Rotary In-
ternational in Seattle, and the third a speech to
the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.
SECRETARY DULLES' STATEMENT ON GE-
NEVA CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 8,
1954: I think that the talks about Korea
Three are pretty close to the end of their
useful life. . . . Unless . . . there is a
important radical change in the Communist posi-
statements by tion, it is not fruitful to go on discussing
Secretary that problem much more. . . . There has
Dulles been . . . a deliberate dragging out of
the negotiations at Geneva while the
Communist military effort has been stepped up in
Indochina itself. . . . The United States has made a
number of suggestions [to meet the Indochina situa-
tion] which all fit into a common and consistent
pattern. The first . . . was . . . that there should be
united action in relation to Indochina.
. . . [if united action is impractical] the
1. Results of United States has no intention of deal-
Geneva ing with the Indochina situation unilat-
erally . . . unless the whole nature of
the aggression should change. . . . [For example] if
there should be a resumption by Communist China of
open armed aggression in that area or in any other
area of the Far East..--
90See ibid., 942-44, June 21, 1954, for Gen. Smith's statement of
June 9th on this matter.
91See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:862-64, June 7, 1954.SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS ON "INTER-
NATIONAL UNITY," SEATTLE, JUNE 10, 1954:
. . . There is no problem more difficult than that of
trying to build unity on a foundation of
diversity. . . . A free society . . . im-
plies difference. . . . those abroad who
unity differ most violently from us are the
same ones who most violently criticize
the fact that we in the United States often differ
among ourselves. . . . differences can mount to a
point where they become a real danger. . . . Perhaps
today there is too much difference between members
of the non-Communist world. . . . However, we can
rejoice in the fact that we can maintain the lofty
goal of fruitful coexistence between difference and
unity. . . . We must find ways whereby despite dif-
ferences, we can cooperate. . . . The most significant
cooperative effort is the United Nations. . . . That
the United Nations can set forces in motion was
shown in Korea. . . . The Korean War had better
not been fought if in the end the aggressors and
their accomplices succeed at Geneva in besmirching
the honor and the prestige of the United Nations.
. . . It may be asked why . . . [the] situation [in
Indochina] has not been brought to the United Na-
tions. I can assure you that this ignoring of the
United Nations was not the choice of the United
States. Now . . . Thailand . . . has taken . . . [this]
situation to the United Nations. . . . "z Thailand has
our strong support in this matter. . . . It is difficult
to see why the negotiations at Geneva would be
impeded by the fact that representatives of the United
Nations were in the area reporting what was going
on. Knowledge has never yet been an impediment to
honest negotiation. . . . What is going on in Indo-
china is a classic example of . . . [the] Communist
strategy [to encourage agitation and revolt in colonial
areas] . . . I can assure you of two things: 1) The
United States is pushing for self-government [in
colonial areas]. . . . 2) When we exercise restraint,
it is because of a reasoned conviction that quick ac-
tion would not, in fact, produce true independence.
. . . The United States some time ago outlined the
conditions which, in its opinion, would justify the
creation of a collective defense of Southeast Asia. At
the head of the list . . . was the stipulation that
there must be assurance that the French will, in fact,
make good on their July 3, 1953, declaration of in-
tention to grant complete independence. The United
States will never fight for colonialism. . . . We do not
assume that we have any mandate to run the world.
. . . We recognize that we have a measure of power
which carries with it certain responsibilities. . . . We
do not accept the view that whenever there is trouble
anywhere, that it is the fault of the United States
and we must quickly fix it. . . . The possibilities of
- solution lie primarily with the peoples directly con-
92The Security Council, June 3, 1954, by a vote of 10 to 1 placed
the question on its agenda.237
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/251/?q=%22~1%22~1: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.