Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 80
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN GROWTH AND ACTION
settlement with the United States. Japanese troops
were already in French Indochina, occupying
bases conceded by the French government on
July 23, 1941. When the United States made re-
moval of these troops a part of the general re-
quest that Japan withdraw her forces from China
and announce her support of the nationalist gov-
ernment of China, the Japanese negotiators were
faced with a difficult decision-whether to pro-
long the discussions or to admit failure and leave
the future developments to the military. This
American proposal of November 26, 1941 was
publicly rejected by the Foreign Minister in Tokyo
on December 1st. But Kurusu and Nomura were
instructed to continue talks with the Americans.
President Roosevelt, meanwhile, had been in-
formed of Japanese plans to invade Thailand, the
independent kingdom formerly
President known as Siam, from the Japanese-
Roosevelt's held positions in Indochina. When
personal Tokyo declined to furnish satisfac-
appeal to tory explanations, the President sent
Emperor a personal message to Emperor Hi-
Hirohito rohito on December 6, 1941, asking
the Japanese sovereign to help pre-
serve peace by withdrawing the Japanese forces
from Indochina. But the note was unavailing and,
as a matter of fact, the Japanese war machine was
already in motion-although, of course, a last
minute decision by the ruling groups in Japan
could have turned it aside from its goals if there
had been any disposition to do so.
The Americans, or at least those in informed
circles, were not lulled into a sense of false security
by the willingness of the Japanese envoys to con-
tinue talks. There was widespread
United States belief that the Japanese would strike
authorities when they believed negotiation
misjudge could accomplish nothing fruitful.
Japan's target But most authorities expected that
the blow would fall in South Asia
or somewhere in the island areas adjacent to the
Japanese homeland. The fact that Pearl Harbor,
and the American fleet based there, constituted
the initial target gave the Japanese the advan-
tage of surprise. However, nothing the Japanese
might have imagined could probably have proved
more unfortunate for them. With this one blow,
damaging as it was to American naval power inthe Pacific, Japan's ambitious military planners
succeeded in uniting the American people in a
determination to avenge what they recognized as
a viciously executed attack delivered with skill,
.but with total disregard for the decencies of in-
ternational behavior.M44)
In this atmosphere of stunned surprise, but with
grim realization of the course ahead, President
Roosevelt went to Congress on December 8, 1941.
There he asked that the members recognize the
state of war in which the nation found itself after
the sudden attack.
DECLARATION OF WAR WITH JAPAN,
WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 8, 1941: Whereas the
Imperial government of Japan has com-
War mitted unprovoked acts of war against
.it .ap.nthe United States of America:
with Japan Therefore be it Resolved . . . That a
state of war between the United States
. . . and Japan which has thus been thrust upon
the United States is hereby formally declared. . . .
The Senate adopted the resolution by a vote of
82 to 0; the House approving, 388 to 1.1 On
December 11, 1941, Germany and
War Italy fulfilled their obligations in
with Germany the 1940 treaty with Japan by an-
and Italy nouncing that they regarded them-
selves as at war with the United
States. Immediately, the American Congress
voted, in each case unanimously, that, since a
state of war existed by act of the Axis powers, the
United States could do nothing but adopt reso-
lutions declaring war upon the European part-
ners of our Oriental adversary.
Thus, the nation which had struggled with the
problems of peace, war, neutrality, and isolation-
ism for more than twenty years since the close of
World War I was embarked upon a globally
extended course to determine whether the aims
and principles for which the United States stood
could be maintained in a world of totalitarian
regimes bent on conquest, expansion, and ruthless
domination.
2. The Declaration of the
United Nations: 1942
With the United States finally in the war, al-
lied unity became of paramount importance.
2The one dissenting vote was cast by Miss Jeanette
Rankin, (Montana Republican) who had cast a negative
vote in 1917 against war with Germany.80
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/94/?q=%22~1%22~1: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.