Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action Page: 83
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THE UNITED STATES WINS WORLD LEADERSHIP IN WAR
cific were threatening the sub-continent of Aus-
tralia. The claims of each of these areas had to
be considered, but allied resources could not be
spared for all.
French North Africa was chosen as the area
of allied attack. The military and political reasons
dictating this decision are familiar to students
of the war. The vast holdings of
The France on the African continent
importance of were a prize in their own right. If
French the Vichy government, then in pre-
North and carious control of much of the
West Africa French overseas empire in North
Africa, were to succumb to Hitler's
pressures and relinquish Morocco, Algeria, and
French West Africa to the Germans, the cause of
the allies would suffer great damage. If the forces
of French resistance based in far-off Brazzaville,
in French Equatorial Africa, were abandoned,
eliminated, or isolated, valuable allied possessions
along the west coast of Africa would fall victims
to the Nazi expansion. And with the Axis in com-
mand of most of Africa down to and beyond the
Equator, the vital air and sea routes across the
south Atlantic would come within easy range of
Axis submarines, air fleets, and surface raiders.
Moreover, if the Mediterranean and its support-
ing land areas could not be secured from the
Axis, any campaigns for the liberation of Europe
would be rendered incalculably difficult, if not
impossible, to conduct.
However, among other considerations, there
was one question of great weight. The anti-Vichy
French, represented by such elements as the Free
French, the French leaders in exile, and some
French military units that had escaped the Nazi
occupation of European France, were supporters
of the United Nations cause, although there had
been no pro-ally French government to sign the
Declaration of 1942. An abortive British attack
on Dakar, the African point nearest South Ameri-
ca, September 22-25, 1940, had angered the
French defenders of that important base. Would
allied attacks on French North African ports and
cities bring similar reactions and vitiate allied
unity? From intelligence information, strengthen-
ed by secret reconnaissance, allied planners be-
lieved that an invasion in force at a number of
French North African points would be welcomedby the populace and meet with only a limited
resistance from the troops stationed in those
areas.
Timed to coincide with the advance of General
Bernard Montgomery's predominately British
forces from El Alamein, a vast invasion force
approached North Africa from the
The United States and the United King-
invasion of dom. On November 8, 1942 land-
French ings at Casablanca, Oran, Algiers,
North Africa and several other coastal points oc-
cupied most of the strategic ports
of French Morocco and Algeria. At some points
the resistance encountered was formidable, at
others it was comparatively light. Within three
days the allied forces had overcome the defenders
and arranged an armistice on November 11th.
Admiral Jean-Frangois Darlan, Vichy representa-
tive in Algiers, signed the armistice,
The allies and the allied forces, mostly British
work with and American units, assumed con-
Admiral trol of the valuable territories of
Darlan French Morocco, Algeria, and
French West Africa. This victory by
the allied armies aroused popular enthusiasm in
the United Nations countries as the first great
triumph after a long series of reverses. But it car-
ried with it serious complications.
Admiral Darlan, who had quickly transferred
his allegiance from Vichy to the Anglo-American
cause in North Africa, was continued in control
as Chief of State, despite the protests of General
Charles de Gaulle, popular but temperamental
leader of the Free French military forces. All
through 1940 and 1941 the United States had
maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy
government of Marshal Henri-Phillippe Petain.
Several times during the war the American State
Department had used its contact with Vichy to
prevent German domination of the Ptain-Laval4
administration from going to the extremes it
might have attempted had not this restraint been
present. Nevertheless, the United States also gave
aid and comfort to the Free French movement
and to General de Gaulle.
With the invasion of North Africa this diplo-
matic balancing act was no longer necessary. The
4 German pressure had forced Marshal Petain to reinstate
Pierre Laval to the Vichy governing council, Apr. 14, 1942.
On Nov. 17 Ptain gave Laval added powers in answer to
German demands.83
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Air University (U.S.). Extension Course Institute. Course 2, Volume 1A. American Foreign Policy in Growth and Action, book, April 1959; Alabama. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1077937/m1/97/?q=%22~1%22~1: accessed July 16, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting National WASP WWII Museum.