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MR. HAGEN: Ernest E. Evans came out of his cabin, had been in bed, assessed the situation and said, "This is an emergency, all hands to General Quarters. Light off all boilers and prepare for an attack on major portion of the Jap fleet." He increased the speed and he finally said, "Left full rudder." What that was for was to lay a smoke screen. This is just an automatic reaction of a fighting man to make a smoke screen to cut down the vision between the two forces. At forty thousand yards you could just barely see tops of them on the horizon. He was the first one. One of the outstanding things that he did was order left full rudder and he proceeded right across the length of our formation in such a way to lay the smoke screen where it would hide the ships and the size of the ships we had and also gave us a brief breathing space where the Japs didn't know what to do. Now the Japs had two choices. They had to decide whether we were one of the fast moving task forces led under Halsey or were we one of the auxiliary CVE groups that have a maximum speed of only 17 knots. So having this brief look allowed by our skipper for them to see what the hell we were, Kurita guessed wrong and he said he thought we were one of Halsey's fast moving dangerous task forces whereas we weren't. At that point the Admiral, Kurita, had to decide how to attack us and he elected to send his cruisers and destroyers and battleships forward and kept his destroyers in reserve and this was a key action. It was exactly the wrong thing to do. So the first thing Commander Evans did was to trick this admiral into fighting the wrong type of a battle. Now, what should the admiral have done under the circumstances that were real? He should have sent his two squadrons of destroyers out ahead similar to what the Admiral Oldendorf, that ran the battle the night before, did. He sent his scores of destroyers ahead of them and they did sixty percent of the damage to the Jap force in Surigao Straits, damage to them before the battleships and cruisers even opened fire. If he had done
properly what I am saying, with the two fast destroyers coming down at 25 to 30 knots passing us by, it would have thrown our screen into an absolute state of chaos. What would they do? So here we were the Japs coming at us at 25-30 knots and the rest of us just running away as fast as our task group commander would allow. Finally, as a result of our continuing making the smoke screen, it was decided that the other ships eventually all started making smoke and even later on even the carriers were making smoke. While we were the only ones the first four or five minutes making smoke, we got shot at a lot.
The National Museum of the Pacific War presents an oral interview with Robert Hagen. Hagen served as the gunnery officer aboard the USS Johnston (DD-557). The ship’s captain, Commander Ernest Evans, was well liked and highly respected by the crew. Hagen recalls the Johnston was with a group of seven destroyers and six escort carriers supporting the troop landing at Leyte Gulf. On 24 October 1944 they were alerted to the approach of a large Japanese force led by Admiral Kurita. Hagen describes in detail the actions involving the Johnston, which led to heavy damage and the eventual sinking of the ship. The actions initiated by Commander Evans led to him being awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. As senior surviving officer of the Johnston, Hagen wrote the recommendation for the award.
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Hagen, Robert.Oral History Interview with Robert Hagen, August 28, 2007,
text,
August 28, 2007;
Fredericksburg, Texas.
(https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth1605240/m1/3/:
accessed July 17, 2024),
University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.;
crediting National Museum of the Pacific War/Admiral Nimitz Foundation.