Texas Attorney General Opinion: V-986 Page: 5 of 6
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Hon. Robert S. Calvert, page 5 (V-986)
sufficient to sustain the validity of the
act.
"We think that there can be no doubt
that there is, because of the difference in
the nature, manner of operation, and purpose,
a reasonable basis for a difference of clas-
sification between the type of machines used
merely for amusement and pleasure, such as
those named in section Is of the act, and
those designed to serve the public health,
convenience, and necessity, such as pay toi-
lets. That being true, the act should not
be stricken down for that reason."
It is noteworthy that the present act adds but
one specific example, i.e., pay telephones in its defi-
nition of "service coin-operated machines.' (Those in-
cluded in the "occupation tax" group in the original ex-
emption provision are still given as examples of this
class in the present statute.)
Thus we have little or no more by way of statu-
tory definition of a "service" machine than had the court
in the Giebel case. We are therefore inclined to adopt
the view of the court that "service" machines are "those
designed to serve the public health, convenience and nec-
essity, such as pay toilets." We find no service of
this character in coin-operated electric scoreboards. In-
deed, it is apparent that the chief service is not for
the convenience of the public but for the convenience of
the "owner" of such machines. We further think that such
service as is rendered the public by the electric score-
boards would be that character of service classed as amuse-
ment or pleasure and therefore within the statutory defi-
nition of a "skill or pleasure coin-operated machine".
Surely the manufacturer of these machines would not per-
mit the suggestion that they do not contribute to the
pleasure of playing the game they are designed to score.
When so used we think they become an integral part of
the game, rendering immaterial the fact that the game
could be played without them. We are therefore of the
opinion that an "owner", as that term is defined in the
Act, of one of these machines would be required to pay
the occupation tax imposed by Articles 7047a-2 to 7047a-
18, V.CoS.
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: V-986, text, January 23, 1950; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth265805/m1/5/: accessed July 12, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.