Texas Attorney General Opinion: V-1200 Page: 5 of 6
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Hon. Wayne L. Hartmn, page 5 (V-1200)
with approval in the e~ Count case. However, as in the
Bena Cout and ida 4jJ oung cases, a statute expree ly
authorized the obligtfons in question. The statute au-
thorized funding certain indebtednesses into bands.
We have not found any case which has held that a
county may issue tine warrants aginast the general fuid
without express authority. Conversely, in the cases which
held that there is an implied power to issue time warrants,
only permanent-type improvements were involved.
As we mentioned earlier in this opinion, Article
2351a-4 expressly authorizes the issuance of time warrants
and bonds to purchase fire fighting equipment to be u*ed
for the protection of county-owned property located in the
county but without the limits of an incorporated city ea
town. This statute was enacted in 1949 by the 51st Legis-
lature (Senate Bill 401, ch. 575, p. 1121). Section 2 of
the act provides, in part, as follows:
"The fact that many counties are in dire need
of fire fighting equipment, and that the e
un canot b.e encumbered by the M isaane of
V eAV # zor bod except bynecific egi-s-lat
au rity, , "I. (Emphasis ss-ad dd.
This is clear legislative recognition that express
legislative authority is mandatory before time warrants a-
gainst the general fund may be issued. Of course, the Leg-
islature must be presumed to know that Article 2351a-l was
already effective.
Two opinions written during previous adminis ra-
tions of this office, Nb. 0-4475 (1952) and 0-7054 (1946),
held that the power to issue time warrants aginst the gen-
eral fund was implied from the power to make expenditure
therefrom. These opinions construed the Bexa and
cases as upholding this principle. As tshonin this
opMion we disagree with such a construction, and Opinions
Nos. 0- 475 and 0-7054 are hereby overruled. It is inter-
estn to note that Aticle 2351a-4 was enacted after the
rendition of those opinions. The language quoted above
shows clearly that the Legislature did not so interpr
the statutes, and did not agree with those opinions.
There is logic in the holding that, without legis-
lative direction,the general fund in future years should
not be encumbered for he expenses of the then present
year. Current expenses must be paid from th general fe4,
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: V-1200, text, July 6, 1951; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth266018/m1/5/?q=%221951~%22: accessed August 15, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.