Texas Attorney General Opinion: M-897 Page: 6 of 11
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Honorable J. Albert Dickie, page 6
tax,6 and even more recently, upheld the constitutionality of
legislation expressly recognized as broadening prior statutory
concepts of exempt charities.'
Since Copperas is a private corporation, exemption cannot
be obtain under the self-executing provisions of Article XI,
Section 9; but it is possible that properties belonging to
Copperas might be exempt by statutes within the constitutional
authorizations of Article VIII, Section 2 for "public property
used for public purposes" or for "institutions of purely public
charity." We will first consider that constitutional author-
ization for exemption of "public property used for public pur-
poses".
In the early case of Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192,
9 S.W. 99 (1888), the Supreme Court declared at page 101:
". .. that section of the constitution seems to apply
to property owned by persons or corporations in private
6 In City of Beaumont v. Fertitta, 415 s.w.2d 902 (Tex. Sup. 1967),
the court held that since municipalities are excepted from the
constitutional requirement of Article VIII, Section I that all
property belonging to natural persons or corporations be taxed,
the legislature could authorize taxation or not as it saw fit;
and since the legislature had not seen fit to authorize the tax-
ation of such properties but had provided for the taxation of
long-term leaseholds on municipal property whereby taxes are
paid by the lessors, municipal property, regardless of the use
to which it is being put, is exempt from taxation.
7 San Antonio Conservation Society, Inc. v. City of San Antonio,
455 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
S"... is the property 'publicly owned' so as to be exempt from
taxes under Article XI, Section 9 of the Constitution? Public
ownership, for tax exemption purposes, must grow out of the facts:
it is a legal status based on facts, that may not be created or
conferred by mere legislative, or even contractual declaration."
Texas Turnpike Company v. Dallas County, 153 Tex. 474, 271 S.W.2d
400,402 (1954).-4373-
(M_897)
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: M-897, text, June 30, 1971; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth270125/m1/6/: accessed July 18, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.