Texas Attorney General Opinion: JM-469 Page: 2 of 3
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Honorable Lloyd Criss - Page 2 (JM-469)
The reasoning followed in Commissioners' Court of El Paso County,
620 S.W.2d 900, is instrutive in determining the scope of section
3(1). The court addressed whether the term "policeman," as defined in
section 3(2) of the act, includes deputy sheriffs employed by
counties. Section 3(2) provides:
The term 'policeman' means each sworn certified
full-time paid elloyee, whether male or female,
who regularly serves in a professional law en-
forcement capacity in the police department of any
city, town, or other political subdivision within
the state, with the sole exception of the chief of
the department.
Ascertaining legislative intent was the court' s primary
objective. See 620 S.W.2d at 901. The court looked "to the entire
Act and not its isolated provisions, keeping in mind at all times 'the
old law, the evil and the remedy."' Id. Public health, safety, and
welfare conditions demand a prohibition on strikes by firefighters and
police. Art. 5154c-1, 2( )(1). Without a right to strike, however,
firefighters and policemen need a method to bargain with and to settle
disputes with their public employers in order to maintain morale.
Id.; 620 S.W.2d at 902. WJth these considerations, the court reasoned
that "[t]he existing evil and the remedy provided apply to deputy
sheriffs as well as other 'policemen.'". Accordingly, the court ruled
that deputy sheriffs fall within section 3(2) of article 5154c-1. 620
S.W.2d at 902.
Similar considerations apply to the instant case. Although
airport rescue personnel may not always be administratively designated
as part of the regular fire department of a political subdivision;
like the regular department, they serve as vital protection for the
public health, safety, and welfare. The nature of the job they
perform rather than a job Label of "firefighter" should control. See
generally Attorney General Opinion H-76 (1973). Consequently, we
believe that they are the type of public employee that the legislature
intended to protect as "firefighters" in article 5154c-I.
Moreover, the courts have followed the legislature's directive
that "ths Act should be, liberally construed." For example, in
Reirstead v. City of San Antonio, 636 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. - San
Antonio 1982), modified, 6t3 S.W,2d 118 (Tex. 1982), the court applied
article 5154c-1 to Emergercy Medical Technicians of the San Antonio
Fire Department. Cf. City of San Antonio v. Aguilar, 696 S.W.2d 648
(Tex. App. - San Antonio 1)85, no writ). These public employees were
personnel of the fire department, but they were not employed in a
fire-fighting capacity. ALt:hough the scope of the term "firefighter"
was not directly in issue, t he case evidences a tacit acceptance of a
liberal construction of the coverage of the term. For these reasons,p. 2148
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: JM-469, text, April 7, 1986; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth272909/m1/2/: accessed June 28, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.