Texas Attorney General Opinion: LO92-036 Page: 2 of 3
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Honorable Gonzalo Barrientos - Page 2
see, eg., Attorney General Opinion JM.499 (1986), we have been precluded from
applying that test to "peace officers" because of the existing unambiguous judicial
language that denominates every "peace officer" a "public officer" under the
constitutional prohibition. See Sawyer, 234 S.W.2d 401; Irwin, 177 S.W.2d 973;
Attorney General Opinion JM-588 (1986) (commissioned officers of the
Department of Public Safety are "public officers" under article XVI, section 40 of
the Texas Constitution).
Thus, in answer to your first question, we are obliged to conclude that a
person may not simultaneously hold the position of police officer, of whatever rank,
for the city of Houston, and the position of police officer, of whatever rank, for the
city of Austin. Qualification for and acceptance of one of these positions results in
an ipso facto relinquishment of the other. Centeno v. Inselmann, 519 S.W.2d 889
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ); Attorney General Opinion MW-170
(1980).
You also ask whether the city of Austin may designate Ms. Watson a
"consultant" for the period between August 20 and December 4, 1992, while she
simultaneously holds the position of assistant chief in Houston. Under even the
broadest reading of article XVI, section 40, a "consultant" does not hold an office.
Attorney General Letter Advisory No. 22 (1973); see also Attorney General Opinion
H-1304 (1978). So long as Ms. Watson does not qualify for and accept any "peace
officer's" position with the city of Austin, she may retain her position with the city of
Houston.
Finally, you inquire whether the city council may immediately confirm Ms.
Watson's position as police chief, to be effective, however, only on December 5,
1992. In Purell v. Carrillo, 349 S.W.2d 263 (Tex Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961), the
court held that a person does not "hold" an office until he "qualifies or enters upon
the duties of [the] office." Id. So long as the city council makes clear in its
resolution of confirmation that Ms. Watson's occupancy of the position of police
chief will not commence until December 5, 1992, she will not be deemed to have
relinquished her position in Houston prior to that time: since the offer is
specifically conditioned on an effective date of December 5, Ms. Watson cannot
either "qualify for," "accept," or "enter upon the duties of" the Austin position until
that date.
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: LO92-036, text, August 20, 1992; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth276365/m1/2/: accessed August 15, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.