Texas Attorney General Opinion: LO92-071 Page: 5 of 7
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Honorable Ron Wilson - Page 5 (10-92-71)
Texas courts have consistently held that the terms of the order calling an
election at which the voters are asked to approve or disapprove financial
undertakings of a governmental body and the terms of preelection orders relating to
the purposes for which such funds shall be used become a solemn contract with the
voters, who are entitled to receive substantially all of the benefits and security of the
contract. See Fletcher v. Howard, 39 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1931); Moore v. Coffman, 200
S.W. 374 (Tex. 1918). In addition, the representations of the governing body outside
of its official orders or resolutions may also give rise to a contract with the voters.
See Devorsky v. La Vega Indep. Sch. Dist., 635 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. App.-Waco
1982, no writ). Any attempt to substantially alter the rights and expectations of the
voters will be treated as a violation of article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution,
which prohibits laws impairing the obligation of contracts. See San Saba County v.
McCraw, 108 S.W2d 200, 203 (Tex. 1937). However, where conditions have so
drastically changed that the governing body cannot fulfill its agreement with the
voters, the courts will not compel the governing body to attempt to do so. See
Invemess Forest Improv. Dit. v. Hardy St. Investors, 541 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.). It is also settled that where the governing
body expressly reserves the discretion to determine the uses to which the electorally-
approved funds shall be put, the court will not interfere with the exercise of that
discretion. See Wright v. Allen, 257 S.W. 980, 986 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1923, writ
refd) (where order calling election stated projects funded by bonds would be
completed in "substantial compliance" with road plan, commissioners court could
make such changes as it deemed necessary).
The language of the ballot proposition submitted for our inspection does not
immediately disclose whether the 25 percent figure was intended to serve as either a
maximum or minimum dedication. Furthermore, the authorities above suggest the
resolution of your fourth question turns not only on the terms of the proposition
submitted to the voters and preeelection orders of the METRO board, but on other
possible representations made to the voters of which we are not aware. The
expectations of the voters may very well depend on facts that we are not apprised of
or on factual determinations which we cannot make in the opinion process.
Consequently, we cannot resolve this issue.
Ut ofMGRO's poice force
The brief filed in conjunction with your opinion request states that the board
of METRO recently agreed to double the size of its police force. You ask whether
METRO may use its police force to investigate motor vehicle accidents that do not
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Texas. Attorney-General's Office. Texas Attorney General Opinion: LO92-071, text, November 3, 1992; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth276570/m1/5/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting UNT Libraries Government Documents Department.