The Texas Historian, Volume 51, Number 3, January 1991 Page: 9
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ings clearly placed the ice flow to the
south. The Titanic's officers did not
appear to understand the nature of
the danger which confronted their
ship. They were looking for a few
small icebergs. Nobody on the bridge
visualized the great ice floe drifting
slowly across the Titanic's path.
The Titanic's bridge trembled
slightly as she passed by the unex-
pected iceberg. According to survi-
vors, the collision with the iceberg
was hardly worth their notice. In fact,
the Titanic nearly missed the gigantic
chunk of ice. But, nearly was not good
enough. The Titanic had been making
about twenty-two knots when the
iceberg was sighted by lookouts
Frederick Fleet and Reginald Lee. The
officer on deck, William Murdoch,
tried to steer the great ship clear by
reversing engines and turning to the
left. These actions proved fatal. The
starboard side of the ship struck the
drifting iceberg and produced a long
paper-cut type wound in six of the
ship's compartments, four more than
the Titanic could afford. However,
according to some experts, had the
Titanic been allowed to collide head-
on with the berg only the front two
compartments would have been
flooded, and she would have remained
afloat. This was not to be the case. The
bleeding began almost at once, and
within a few moments of the injury,
the Titanic's boiler and engine rooms
began to flood. Suddenly the unex-
pected had become reality. Negligence
had replaced caution and, as a result,
cold saltwater became anunwelcomed
cabin mate.
The masterdesigner and builder of
the Titanic, Thomas Andrews, knew
his ship was not perfect. While exam-
ining his creation during the first few
days of the Titanic's maiden voyage,
he felt there were too many screws in
the stateroom hat hooks and the
reading and writing room was a
complete waste of valuable state-
rooms. His eye for color coordination
told him the wicker furniture on one
side of the ship ought to be stained
green. Not until he had gone with
Captain Edward J. Smith to investi-
gate the damage caused by the iceberg
did he realize his main concerns for
the ship had been blindly trivial. His
decisions to enlarge the cargo space
by eliminating the double hull, cut
cost by using thinner metal, and riv-
eting her together rather than weld-
ing her became bigger mistakes withHuman decisions,
greatly influenced
by a desire for
opulence, sank the
Titanic. Technology
did not fail
man. Man failed
technology.
each gallon of water that poured into
his doomed creation. Andrews' choice
to have an open salon and a ballroom
instead of the high bulkheads, which
would have prevented the ship from
sinking, turned out to be his biggest
mistake. The water soon flowed over
the low bulkheads and into the re-
maining ten compartments; the great
ship was soon sucked to the bottom of
the ocean floor.
The Titanic was far from a triumph
of safe construction or the best prod-
uct of man's technological genius.
Existing technology, which could
have been applied to build a safer
ship, was there and certainlyavailable.
It was available in the double hull and
high bulkheads. It was there in the
newly-discovered welding techniques
and stronger metals recently devel-
oped. However, were these techno-
logical omissions the real cause of the
disaster? Was the Titanic really an
unsafe ship? Perhaps she was not. Dr.
Robert Ballard, the oceanographer
who found the Titanic on the ocean
floor in 1985, concluded the tragedy
should not overshadow the fact that
the Titanic was a relatively safe ship,
not only according to the standards
of her times but ours as well. K. C.
Bamably in his work Some Ship Disas-
ters and Their Causes also concluded
the Titanic was a safe ship. So what
were the causes of the Titanic tragedy?
Throughout history, new discov-
eries in science and technology have
merely represented increases in power.
"Power" in the words of Sir Alexander
Fleck "is neither good nor evil, but in
the last analysis, power is subjected to
the good sense or the stupidity of the
men who use it." Was the Titanic a
victim of irrational human decision-
making rather than technologicalweakness? Let us take a closer look.
In the early hours before the di-
saster the wireless telegraph had
tapped out messages ofwamingwhich
were ignored by the ship's high rank-
ing officers. Because the Titanic was
making twenty-two knots, speed must
also be considered as a primary factor.
This speed was far too fast consider-
ing existing conditions. Well-con-
structed lifeboats had been left be-
hind in England. The casual-almost
arrogant attitude-of the passengers
and crew must also be considered.
They actually believed the ship was
indestructible. Why else would they
have ignored the danger? The list of
negligence is endless and horrifying.
Well-meaning men who had supposed
they were building a mountain were
instead digging graves. Human deci-
sions, greatly influenced by a desire
for opulence, sank the Titanic. Tech-
nology did not fail man. Man failed
technology.
Following the Titanic disaster
governments from western nations
met and enacted laws and regulations
which were designed to prevent a
future tragedy. All sea-going ships
must now be equipped with enough
lifeboats for every person on board.
These governments also established
the International Ice Patrol. Still the
larger issues have not been addressed.
Safety is still pitted against profit and
life lost in return for comfort. How-
ever, the cause of most accidents still
remains human disregard for the rules
and man's arrogant underestimation
of nature. It is a surety that science
and technology affected the way the
men of the past thought, lived, and
died but, before the world can be made
a safer place we must first realize that
advancements in science and tech-
nology will never make us safe from
ourown human weaknesses and errors
in judgment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Robert D. Ballard, The Discovery of the
Titanic, 1987.
-, Exploring the Titanic, 1988.
Lawrence Beesley, The Loss of the SS
Titanic, 1912.
Thomas E. Bonsall, Titanic, 1987.
Richard Brown, Voyage of the Iceberg,
1983.
Shan Bullock, Shipbuilder, 1913.January 1991 / 9
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Texas State Historical Association. The Texas Historian, Volume 51, Number 3, January 1991, periodical, January 1991; Austin, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth391294/m1/11/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting Texas State Historical Association.