Hellcat News, (Springfield, Ill.), Vol. 33, No. 3, Ed. 1, November 1978 Page: 7 of 20
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suit in the death of hundreds and
the failure of the combat teams'
mission.
(A German radio operator was
found after the battle to have
been hidden near the field tele-
phone line with a wire tap leading
to his radio hideout.) This must
have been the source of informa-
tion of the night movement and
upcoming tank attack which en-
abled the Germans to prepare for
the attack and prevent being sur-
prised.)
Did Major Johns keep the Ger-
mans posted as well as his own
General as he reported in the
clear during the night, the pro-
gress of his units crossing the
canal into No Man's land?
This was the first of four pro-
blems, three man made, and a
fourth created by nature, that
brought defeat to CC"Z" its first
time in battle.
The cut in the telephone line
was spliced and Major Johns pro-
ceeded to his post in the center
of the line of departure to keep
the General informed as to the
progress of the attack.
Soon after midnight Major
Johns had reported to Headquart-
ers the Infantry crossing the line
of departure on time but now at
the first breaking of dawn, in-
tense machine gun and sporadic
small arms fire were coming
from the open field. The Opera-
tions Officer in the Headquarters
Van could not believe Major
Johns when he reported all the
small arms fire and automatic
fire was in the open field and
sounded like it was all coming
from American guns.
(An after battle investigation
showed what had happened. Over
ninety American Infantry men
had been bunched up together at
daylight in an open flat field. One
German outpost armed with one
captured American machine gun,
at a range of fifty yards, was
able to kill the entire command.
To make the battle scene more
weird the native troops from
North Africa in the Free French
Sector had gone on to the battle-
field and stripped the bodies of
all valuables - in every case the
dead man's combat boots had
been removed.)
The diversion attack toward
Boweiler over the Bailey bridge
was reported by Major Johns to
have slowed down and fourteen
American tanks burning at the
same time in a small area near
the Bailey bridge. Headquarters
would not believe the report.
They ordered Major Johns to go
by jeep and ascertain that they
were all American tanks and if
so what had happened.
Nov. 1978 HELLCAT NEWS Page 7
HOW MANY DO YOU WANT?
This is a scene at the desk of the photographer who took
the scan scenes during the Minneapolis dinner-dance. He had
proofs to show that evening and took orders from those in at-
tendance. If you were there, it wasn't hard to find yourself on
the photographs. Doc. Tiberio, 43rd making a 32nd Reunion
choice.
Major Johns went by jeep up
the German side of the canal
through the early morning, low
layer of fog to determine what
had stopped the diversion attack
of tanks; not knowing the low fog
layer that covered his jeep was
the reason.
The first blood bath of this new
armored combat command was
being truly tried by the god of
war.
The attack of the tanks over the
Bailey bridge to act as a divers-
ion of the main attack failed be-
cause the night movement of in-
fantry did not penetrate the
woods and also because Major
Johns' telephone had been tapped
which enabled the Germans to
come out of their underground
shelters and move their 88 mm
anti-tank guns from the Rhine
River bridges to the edge of the
woods and use them as anti-
tank guns.
Why were only American tanks
destroyed? Not a German vehicle
nor German soldier could be seen
on the battlefield, where fourteen
American tanks were burning.
The upper part of the tank
turret was exposed above the fog.
The tank commander could not
see the ground mounted 88 mm
anti-tank guns that had been
mounted in the edge of the woods
and were covered by fog.
The 88's could pick off the key
command tanks because they
were marked by signal flags
mounted on the radio antennas.
(These signal flags had been
found helpful in identification
and control in the desert tank
battles in North Africa. But here
in the low lying Rhine River fog,
the antenna signal flags had be-
come a perfect target for the
deadly German 88 anti-tank guns
and were the mark of death.)
The fog lifted and disappeared
in less than an hour. By that
time the diversion attack had
stopped and most of its tanks de-
stroyed. Major Johns had to re-
turn to his position under small
arms fire.
After the night movement of
the Infantry advance party failed
to occupy the woods before day-
light and the diversion tank at-
tack had failed because of the
fog, Major Johns began reporting
the progress of the main attack
now under way crossing the canal
bridge near his front line tele-
phone post.
The tanks were in column with
the infantry mounted on the tank
deck using a field road with a
tree line of tall Normandy pop-
lars as the route of attack, thr-
ough a mine field. (This proved
to be a fateful decision to have
the main tanks attack through a
minefield on a narrow front,
based on the assumption all anti-
tank defenses would have been
destroyed.)
The lead tanks had the tank
commander with his upper body
exposed, leading through the
minefield on this road with tall
trees along side. A sniper tore
a gaping hole in the tank com-
mander. Without reason the tank
driver returned to the battlefield
first aid station near Major
Johns' telephone positon and
dropped off the dying tank com-
mander. Without hesitation a ser-
geant came up out of the tank
and took the place of the Lieuten-
ant and the tank returned to the
head of the column of tanks. Near
the tree line on the way toward
the objective. The German sniper
continued to pick off the exposed
tank commander in the lead tank.
For some unknown reason the
tanks brought all victims of snip-
er fire back to the first aid sta-
tion. Never losing a tank nor ever
penetrating the minefield.
How could men be trained to
act so brave or so foolish? After
five tank commanders had been
shot, the attack was called off.
The tanks returned to the rear.
The canal which had been the
line of departure was now once
again the front line occupied by
Major Johns and a few stragglers
standing behind an abandoned
half-trak with a .50 calibre mach-
ine gun mounted on it. Johns with
his .45 cal. pistol and field tele-
phone to CC"Z" was the senior
office represent.
Not one soldier had hesitated to
expose himself in the lead tank
nor replace a buddy shot in act-
ion. Was Major Johns a coward
or unfit to be an officer? He had
no command but he could see
what was happening. He had an
abandoned armored half-trak
with a .50 cal. machine gun
mounted on it. He was not sure
he could operate it. But if he tried
would he only draw enemy fire?
What would be accomplished?
There were stragglers taking
cover behind the half-track. He
could order them to shoot at the
snipers in the tree line. Why
didn't he set the example and
give the command to fire? Was
he scared he would draw un-
necessary fire into his telephone
outpost? Did he have the same
problem of people on the street
of a big city that do not want to
become involved with a crime or
accident taking place before their
very eyes?
Was it his personal character
that made Major Johns refuse
to endorse a battlefield decora-
tion for a medical officer from
the rear echelon who was at the
combat first aid station by ac-
cident? While present he only
observed what the corpsman did
for the sniper victims brought
in. He did not volunteer to go out
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Twelfth Armored Division Association (U.S.). Hellcat News, (Springfield, Ill.), Vol. 33, No. 3, Ed. 1, November 1978, newspaper, November 1978; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth410656/m1/7/: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; crediting The 12th Armored Division Memorial Museum.