Texas Jewish Post (Fort Worth, Tex.), Vol. 56, No. 6, Ed. 1 Thursday, February 7, 2002 Page: 3 of 24
twenty four pages : ill. ; page 16 x 12 in. Scanned from physical pages.View a full description of this newspaper.
Extracted Text
The following text was automatically extracted from the image on this page using optical character recognition software:
IN OUR 56TH YEAR! — THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002 TEXAS JEWISH POST
Features 3
The Rocky U.S. - Palestinian Relationship
By Michael J. Jordan
NEW YORK. - After 12 years of
peaks and valleys, U.S. relations
with the Palestinian leadership may
be sliding toward rock bottom.
President Bush said recently
that he is “very disappointed”
with Palestinian Authority
President Yasser Arafat for
“enhancing terror.”
Bush's unhappiness -which
comes on the eve of his sched-
uled meeting with Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon - is the
latest episode in a complex, tur-
bulent relationship.
Arafat first popped into the
American consciousness in the
late 1960s.
From 1948 until the 1967 Six-
Day War, many nations had
viewed the Palestinians prima-
rily as refugees, not as a people
demanding statehood.
After working as an engineer in
Kuwait, Arafat and some com-
rades started Fatah, the Palestinian
National Liberation Movement, in
Jerusalem on Jan. 1, 1965.
Not long after, in 1968, he
began a series of terrorist attacks
against Israel. In 1969, Arafat was
elected chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization's execu-
tive committee - Fatah is the
PLO's main component - a title
he retains to this day.
Arafat first landed on U.S. soil in
1974, famously appearing before
the U.N. General Assembly carry-
ing both a gun and an olive branch.
Still, in 1975, Washington
refused to recognize Arafat and
the PLO as official representa-
tives of the Palestinian people.
On Sept. 1 of that year, U.S.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal
Allon signed the U.S.-Israel
Memorandum of Agreement,
which made Palestinian recogni-
tion of Israel and renunciation of
terrorism a precondition for rela-
tions with Washington.
However, a State Department
official was quoted as saying
that the “legitimate interests of
the Palestinian Arabs must be
taken into account.”
On March 16, 1977, President
Carter said the Palestinians
deserved a homeland; the Camp
David accord he presided over
in September 1978 mentioned
“the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people.”
President Reagan took a hard-
er line. His administration
dropped the talk of Palestinian
rights and self-determination
and referred to Palestinians
mostly as refugees and terrorists.
In 1985, Congress passed a
law that again vowed not to rec-
ognize the PLO until it
renounced terrorism and
accepted Israel's right to exist.
In 1987, the first Palestinian
intifada erupted in the territo-
ries. In October of that year
Palestinian terrorists hijacked
the Achille Lauro ship - killing
a wheelchair-bound American
Jew - and on Dec. 22 Congress
passed the Anti-Terrorism Act.
It implicated Arafat in the murder
of a U.S. ambassador, blamed the
PLO for “the murders of dozens of
Americans,” and deemed it “a ter-
rorist organization and a threat to
the interests of the U.S.”
Seeking legitimacy, the PLO
began to bend in 1988.
Washington denied Arafat a
visa and a return visit to die
United Nations, prompting the
U.N. General Assembly, an Arab-
and Muslim-dominated body, to
accommodate him with a special
session in Geneva in December.
But Washington already was
negotiating indirectly with the
PLO, through third parties.
As the U.N. meeting unfolded,
and with the knowledge and sup-
port of the American and Swedish
governments, Arafat was in
Stockholm for two days of talks
with five American Jewish leaders.
The quintet represented the so-
called International Center for
Peace in the Middle East: Rita
Hauser, Menachem Rosensaft,
Drora Kass, Stanley Sheinbaum
and Abraham Udovitch.
With the support of the
Palestine National Council, which
endorsed the language a month
earlier in Algiers, Arafat and his
Jewish counterparts hashed out an
agreement he believed would
encourage the United States to
recognize the PLO: It seemed to
call for a two-state solution and
Israel's withdrawal to its 1967
borders, apparently rejected ter-
rorism and recognized Israel.
Arafat presented his vision to
the General Assembly on Dec.
13, 1988.
Washington immediately criti-
cized Arafat’s words as ambiguous
- and the Palestinian leader was
forced to clarify his comments the
next day at a press conference.
“Our desire for peace is a strat-
egy and not an interim tactic,” he
said. “We are bent to peace come
what may. Our statehood pro-
vides salvation to the Palestinians
and peace to both Palestinians
and Israelis. Self-determination
means survival for the
Palestinians. And our survival
does not destroy the survival of
the Israelis as their rulers claim.
“As for terrorism, I renounced
it yesterday in no uncertain terms,
and yet I repeat for the record that
we . totally *u}d absolutely
renounce all forms of terrorism,
including individual, group and
state terrorism. Between Geneva
and Algiers we have made our
position crystal clear.
“Enough is enough. Enough is
enough. Enough is enough. All
remaining matters should be
discussed around the table.”
With that, Reagan - in the last
days of his presidency, and per-
haps at the request of incoming
President Bush - recognized the
PLO, despite Israel's indignation
and its fears of greater violence.
On Dec. 16, U.S. officials opened
a dialogue with the PLO in Tunis.
In a Dec. 22 letter intended to
reassure Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir, Reagan wrote:
“Nothing in this decision should be
construed as weakening the United
States' commitment to Israel's
security, diminishing our fight
against terrorism in all its forms, or
indicating our acceptance of an
independent Palestinian state.”
‘T am under no illusions about the
PLO. Their words will have to be
supported by actions, namely a con-
tinuing renunciation of terrorism
everywhere and disassociation
from those who perpetrate it.
Nevertheless, I believe that our dia-
logue with the PLO potentially can
encourage realism and pragmatism
within the Palestinian leadership
and thus contribute to a comprehen-
sive resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, in which the long-term
security of Israel can be achieved ”
During his term. Bush forged
ahead with talks with the PLO.
But the thaw in U.S.-Palestinian
relations was disrupted on May
30, 1990, when Palestinians
launched a seaborne attack on
the beaches of Tel Aviv.
Israel’s security forces killed
four terrorists in what they said
was a plot to murder tourists.
The PLO refused to denounce
the attack, and Bush broke off
talks on June 20 of that year.
During the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, with much of the world
aligned with Washington against
Iraq, Arafat threw his weight
behind Saddam Hussein.
After Iraq's defeat, on March 6,
1991, Bush announced a renewed
Mideast peace effort. Still, at the
Madrid peace talks on Oct. 30,
1991, both Washington and
Jerusalem treated the Palestinians
not as a separate entity, but as part
of the Jordanian delegation.
However, Palestinians and
Israelis sat and negotiated pub-
licly for the first time.
Nearly two years later, on Aug.
19, 1993, Israel and the PLO
secretly initialed a “Declaration
of Principles” in Oslo, which
established a blueprint for future
talks and a land-for-peace for-
mula for solving the conflict.
On Sept. 10, the two sides for-
mally agreed to recognize the
other, and President Clinton
announced his intention to
revive U.S.-PLO talks.
Three days later, on Sept. 13, the
Oslo agreement was announced,
and a historic handshake between
Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin took place on the
White House lawn. The agree-
ment formally ended the first
Palestinian intifada, or uprising.
In 1994, the Nobel Peace
Prize was jointly awarded to
Arafat, Rabin and Israeli
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.
Arafat went on to become the
most frequent foreign visitor to
the Clinton White House.
In October 1998, with Clinton
overseeing the Wye River negotia-
tions, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to a
further redeployment of Israeli
forces from the West Bank and
gave the Americans a direct role in
security arrangements. For his part,
Arafat pledged - again - to crack
down on terrorists, confiscate ille-
gal weapons, prevent incitement,
and amend the P1X) Charter to
remove all anti-Israel references.
At the White House signing of
the Wye Memorandum. Clinton
lauded Arafat for “decades and
decades and decades of tireless
representation of the longing of
the Palestinian people to be free,
self-sufficient, and at home."
Clinton also noted the “distin-
guished military careers” of
Arafat, Netanyahu and Jordan's
King Hussein, who was also in
attendance.
A Palestinian official later said it
was “an acknowledgment that the
years of Palestinian armed strug-
gle are not considered terrorism."
This heralded what some saw as a
new era in U.S.-Palestinian rela-
tions. In ensuing months American
officials often praised Arafat for
meeting his obligations, while criti-
cizing Israelis for slacking on theirs.
In December 1998, amid talk of
impeachment over the Monica
Lewinsky scandal, Clinton led a
delegation that included 18 Arab-
American leaders on an histone
visit to the Gaza Stnp. He was
greeted by Palestinians waving
Palestinian and U.S. Hags, and signs
with pictures of Clinton and Arafat
that read, “We have a dream.”
Clinton addressed the
Palestinian legislative council and
other Palestinian leaders, speaking
passionately about their aspira-
tions “to shape a new Palestinian
future on your own land” and their
concerns about the “separation of
families, restriction of movement,
settlement activity, land confisca-
tions and home demolitions.”
He also commented, "Neither
side has a monopoly on pain or
virtue ... both share a history of
oppression and dispossession.”
With months to go in his second
term in office, Clinton convened
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
and Arafat in July 2000 for a second
Camp David summit After 17
days, talks collapsed without a deal,
and Clinton publicly blamed Arafat.
In late September, Palestinians
unleashed a second violent
intifada. Despite that, Clinton
continued pressuring the two
sides toward peace, releasing the
most detailed U.S. peace plan
yet in late December. However,
he was not able to get the parties
to sign an agreement before he
left office in January 2001.
President Bush adopted a more
laissez-faire approach to the con-
flict, preferring that Israel and the
Palestinians work it out themselves.
He quickly invited Sharon, the
Israeli prime minister, to the
White House - and has wel-
comed him two more times since.
Bush has yet to meet Arafat,
but last year became the first
U.S. president to refer to a
“state of Palestine.”
On April 6, 2001. six months
into the intifada, 87 members of
the U.S. Senate and 209 mem-
bers of the House sent letters to
Bush asking him to reassess
U.S.-Palestinian relations.
The Senate letter began. “We are
writing you out of a deep sense of
frustration, anger and concern
over recent events in the Middle
East. Less than eight months ago
at Camp David, Israel offered a
final status proposal to the
Palestinians that was breathtaking
in the scope of its concessions.
‘The Palestinians rejected the
Israeli offer, and a member of
the Palestinian Authority said:
‘The issues of Jerusalem, the
refugees and sovereignty will
be decided on the ground and
not in negotiations.* ”
Today - less than a month
after Israelis intercepted a
weapons-laden ship destined
for the Palestinians - Bush, like
Congress, may have reached his
breaking point.
Material drawn from The
Associated Press, the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Congressional Research Service
of the Library of Congress, the
Palestinian National Authority
Ministry of Information, Arab
American Institute, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy
and others.
Michael J. Jordan is a
TJP/JTA correspondent.
Upcoming Pages
Here’s what’s next.
Search Inside
This issue can be searched. Note: Results may vary based on the legibility of text within the document.
Tools / Downloads
Get a copy of this page or view the extracted text.
Citing and Sharing
Basic information for referencing this web page. We also provide extended guidance on usage rights, references, copying or embedding.
Reference the current page of this Newspaper.
Wisch, Rene. Texas Jewish Post (Fort Worth, Tex.), Vol. 56, No. 6, Ed. 1 Thursday, February 7, 2002, newspaper, February 7, 2002; Fort Worth, Texas. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth753754/m1/3/: accessed June 30, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; .