National Intelligencer. (Washington City [D.C.]), Vol. 13, No. 1966, Ed. 1 Saturday, April 24, 1813 Page: 2 of 4
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From the Old Aurortt. 1
PROSPECTS i.\ POLAND.
The auvices 1'rom France and Eng-
land are so late as six weeks before this
time, from Lisbon four weeks. The
news from France, unless where the
transactions are of an official kind, such,
as bulletins and addresses of public
functionaries,, are .always very much in
abstract, rarely given without resery ,
and more rarely with any sort of reason-
ing.
The British accounts are usually on
the other extreme—me most trifling
circumstances are magnified by circutn-
stuntial inductions, ana anticipations ol
the judgment are made without afford
ing tne judgment scope to decide for
itself—exaggeration and suppression
alike characterize the British newspa-
pers, the management of which is a part
of the machinery of their policy—cuicu
latcd alike to beguile the unfortunate
people of England, and to abuse all other
people.
The news from Portugal cannot be
presumed to be exempted from the
common character of their policy with
the press—-the more extravagant their
representations ol their own success
and the failures, of France, the better
adapted they are to subserve their poli-
cy, and sustain their rule over the Spa-
niards ana Portuguese.
Under xuch circumstances, all the ac-
counts which we receive from Europe,
must be read with caution and distrust.
The rival powers have an interest and a
disposition to exaggerate their suc-
cesses, and mitigate their disasters;
and it is only by the touchstone of rea-
soning upon natural and obvious facts,
tii * t we can safely approximate the
truth.
We have seen the disasters of the
French army after the opening of the
last winter, constantly accumulating
from tne 1st of November to the last
day of December. The 29th bulletin
is, perhaps, unexampled In the annuls
of history, as the avowal of a disconcert-
ed chief, ol the extent and variety of
disasters which his army had under-
gone; as is the speech to the senate,in
which the French chief acknowledges
that those disasters would have broken
bis heart, hart not motives of a higher
nature resolved him upon-rising above
them, and retrieving them by more
mighty efforts.
The military transactions of the
French alter the treachery of the Prus-
sian corps near Riga, present an aspect
more military and dramatic, than those
■which arose out of the strife with the
elements and the climate of Russia
The movements on the left by marshal
Macdonald, remind us of the renowned
march from Naples to the Trebia, and
the successful resistance, the desperate
battle, and the complete retreat of a
handful of troops, exhausted by a march
the whole l ngth of Italy, against the
five-fold numbers of Russians and Aus-
trians, under the barbarian Suwaroff
and Alvinzy. We see Macdonald cross-
ing the Niemen, and while he affects to
occupy and strengthen Konigsburg, ac-
tually arrange his route for Elbing;
keep open his communications ivith
the corps d’urmie of the viceroy of
Italy, and king of Naples ; and prepare
subsistence for his columns in Marien-
Jburg.
The co-operation of prince Eugene
in the centre, and in the route from Wil-
na, by Mirecz to Grodno, Bialystock,
and until they reached the left of the
Bug, exhibited a scries of prodigious
efforts of military art to repel a pursu-
ing enemy, and to preserve an army so
much crippled by every kind of calami-
ty. The advance of the corps of prince
Eugene in front of the Bug, as far as
Pultusk, and along the left side of the
NarCw, indicate either very powerful
operations on the part of the viceroy’s
co’ps, or that the Russian force was
thrown in mass towards the lower Vis-
tula.
The Austrian corps under the prince
Schwartzenberg, and the Polish corps
under Regnier, appear to have retained
their position, with little variation, be-
tween the Pinsk, and on the south of the
canal of Kobryn, with their left extend-
ing close to the Upper Bug and to War-
saw.
These positions the French force had
occupied in the middle of January;
when the corps of Macdonald, with that
of Victor, by which he had been rein-
forced, passed the Vistula, and distri-
buted their force near Dantzic and the
strong places between the Vistula and
Oder.
The light troops of Cossacks of the
Russian army, had penetrated the coun-
try in which the French had taken up
their cantonments, and committed their
customary depiedations; the terror of
their arms had spread farther than they
bad proceeded ; but it is by no means
improbable that the whole of the coun-
try on the Vistula, and the whole of East
Prussia, will be left s desolate as Mos-
cow, before the campaign has assumed
a military character.
The French will avoid a discursive
warfare—their magazines will be or-
ganized in Franconia and Westphalia ;
their corps d’armie will concentrate
upon the Elbe anftl Wezer, and some of
them proceeding by the left banks of the
Nolec and the \Vartha, will concentrate
above Thorn, behind the Vistula; by
■which they compel the Russians to fall
Ijack upon Egst Prussia and Samogitia,
or be taken in the flank and rear
probable plan of the French campaign,
we shall venture to anticipate, as it ap-
pears from the nature of the theatre of
war and its resources to be pointed out.
The last campaign appears to have
been calculated to produce either of two
effects: 1st, a submission of Alexander
on the occupation of Moscow, through
the pressure upon the oligarchs of that
city; 2d, or the destruction of the re-
sources which would be requisite for a
second campaign.
Perhaps both these objects were con-
templated ; it is evident the first disap-
pointed the hopes of this profound war-
rior ; in the second it is certain that he
has, though at immense loss, succeeded
The northern provinces of Russia derive
their principal subsistence from the
south. The rich countries which are
fertilized by the numerous waters which
flow into the Dneiper, from the palati-
nate of Mscislaw to the government of
Katherinoslau, are the store-houses of
the northern provinces; the Russians
being all slaves, and their food wretch-
ed, their industry is only the effect of
force or the last necessity, and there can
be no providence where there is no firo-
fierty; a term known only to the masters
of the millions of that barbarous region.
An invading army therefore cannot
subsist on the soil of Russia by Russian
resources, since the provinces which
are the seats of power and the theatre
of war, are not themselves, at the best
of times, sufficiently productive for
their wretched population. Lithuania
more fertile, and the Poles more indus-
trious and civilized, under the opera-
tions of war, has incurred the same fate
by the exhaustion of war; and the open-
ing of the summer, which in the usual
term gave a rapid vegetation, will now
only open the routes for armed legions.
The plough and mattoc will be super-
ceded by the sword and aftillery. War
reaps no harvest but that of glory or ol
death.
The French chief will probably seize
upon the circumstances of the country
and seasons, and make an ally of afflic-
tion. An army of great force will ex
tend from Warsaw to the Dneiper in the
first instance; it will be the reserve ol
the grand army, until the grand army
shall have gained the Neimen ; which
may, perhaps, cause two actions; but
the Russians will be forced to the Dwi-
na, and the army of reserve will then
change its front—it will be in two lines ;
the fu st will be faced to the south, and
have its left on the Wolga, its centre on
the Abalow or Desna, keeping its com-
munication with the moveable depots in
East Prussia; the second line of the
same army will be faced to the north,
extending in the same direction from
east to west; and this army will be the
rendezvous for the Polish levies and the
Cossacs who will be invited to the Aus-
trian and French standard; its object
will be to cut off supplies and commu-
nications with the southern provinces.
This force will, perhaps, contain in each
line four corps u’armie of 25,000 men
each—or 100,000 in each line.
The grand army will probably consist
of six corps d’armie in three lines ; and
their march will be regulated as in the
campaign which concluded with the
battle of Friedland, and the movements
upon Moscow ol last year; each line in
succession performs the service of the
march in advance , sustained by the two
successive lines of reserve.
It is probable that the march for Pe-
tersburg will be in this campaign as di-
rect and as rapid as that after the cross-
ing of the Alps. It will be a succession
of manoeuvring battles(; the left will
probably pursue the marginal road of
the Baltic, the right will move by the
lake of Pekow.
The Russians may probably make a
powerful stand at that lake, and perhaps
at Narva, against the French left wing
But it is very probable that the month
of June will bring the French to doth
these theatres of signal battle ; and that
in July, if their flag does not ilo. ton the
battlements of Petersburg, there will be
another peace of Tilsit with the closing
of the Baltic.
It is not in the nature of human af-
fairs that any other should be the .result
of the approaching campaign. The,tide
which has flowed from Moscow to Dant-
zic, is about the present time on the ebb ;
it carries back with its reflux the waters
of bitterness and calamity. So terrible
a scene of conflict and devastation the
earth has not witnessed as is to be pre-
sented in the three ensuing months.
Our ministers may, perhaps, arrive in
time to be present at a treaty of general
peace.
To the Editor of the National Advocate.
SIR,
I have just seen the following pa-
ragraph, in the Columbian Centinei of
the 14th inst. printed at Boston, and
think it my duty to make some remarks
on the misrepresentations (to call them
by no harsher name) which it contains.
It appears to have been taken from a
New York paper; but this is the first
moment it has met my eye, or it should
have been sooner noticed by me.
“ NEW-YORK.5'
“ New-York, Ajiril 20.
“ Tobias Lear, Esq. late our Consul in Al-
giers, has arrived here from Gibraltar, via Ca-
diz. When driven from Algiers by the Barba-
rian Dey, he sought and found an asylum in
the dominions of that nation which has been
declared our enemy-—and the enemy which Mr.
Leak’s masters have falsely insinuated as being
the instigators of the war. He knows how base
The \ the insinuafion Is; for he knows that it was
diving to thp improvidence (to call it by n®
J .. ,
harsher narie) of the American administration,
and the well-known caprice of the Dey.”
The manner in which I was sent
from Algiers, having been fully detail-
ed in a letter to the -Secretary of State,
and since published in the newspapers
of .the United States, makes it unne-
cessary to touch upon that point here.
But the same letter contains some re-
marks which clearly show that I had
reason ta think the conduct of the Dey
of Algiers towards the United States,
was instigated by the British ; and so
far am I from considering that insinua-
tion base, that I have good grounds for
believing it true.
With respect to my knowing that the
improvidence of the American admini-
stration was the cause of the outrage-
ous conduct of the Dey of Algiers a-
gainst the United States, I shall only
say, that I know the reverse ; as it Was
universally acknowledged by the pub-
lic functionaries, and others in Algiers,
that the government of the United
States had been remarkably faithful in
the fulfilment of their treaty and stipu-
lations with the Dey and Regency of
Algiers.
I arrived in Gibraltar, on board the
ship Allegany, (which had carried the
stores to Algiers in fulfilment of treaty
stipulations,' and which the Dey refused
to receive) on the 4th of August. On
the 8th, the ship was admitted to prat-
tock; and in the night of that day
(while I was ,yet on board the ship with
my family) an officer came on board
from the ship ol the British comman-
der afloat in the Bay of Gibraltar, and
demanded of. the Captain the register,
and other papers of the ship, which
were delivered to him ; and he then in-
formed us, that an account had reached
Gibraltar, that evening, of the United
States having declared war against G.
Britain; and that he was sent, by the
British commodore to take possession
of the Allegany, and all other Ameri-
can vessels then in the bay of Gibral-
tar. The day following, the Allegany
was removed to the New Mole, and
anchored under the guns of the saluting
battery, in a place well known in Gib-
raltar by the name of Rotten Row,
where she was moored, her sails un-
bent, a guard pul on board her, and all
the crew, excepting the captain, mate,
and one seamen, taken out and put on
board the prison ship. The day after,
I was permitted to go on shore with
my family, and such things as we had
been able to bring with us from Algiers.
I stated to the British commander a-
float, Commodore Penrose, the Circum-
stances under which the Allegany had
entered the Bay of Gibraltar, to seek
the rites of hospitality (having been
driven from Algiers) without any view
or intention of profiting by commercial
speculation; and therefore flattered
myself, that, whatever might be the
fate of the vessel and cargo, the master
and crew would be permitted to return
home without detention The commo-
dore in his reply, expressed himself
fully sensible of the peculiar situation
in which the crew of the Allegany were
placed ; but as it was wholly out of his
power to take any measures respecting
the crew, without orders, he promised
to apply to his Commander in chief (the
British Admiral at Lisbon) for permis-
sion to show peculiar indulgence to the
Allegany’s crew. But it does not ap-
pear that such permission was ever
granted, as the crew remained on board
the prison ship in Gibraltar Bay, where
the captain, mate and men, who were
at first permitted to remain on board
the Allegany', were afterwards sent;—
the ship and cargo were condemned by
that notorious tribunal, a British Vice
Admiralty Court, the crew were sent
•to England, and captain Eveleth, mas-
ter of the Allegany, was permitted to
return with me to the U. States, on his
parole, and the security of Richard S.
Hacklcy, Esq. and myself, that he
would not bear arms against G. Britain
until exchanged.
I was permitted to reside in Gibral-
tar, with my family, without restraint;
our little property, which we saved
from Algiers, was not molested ; and
in December last I went to Cadiz in a
British transport, in which commodore
Penrose had the politeness to give a
passage to myself and faffiily. Captain
Eveleth had his adventure on board the
Allegany restored to him, when the
ship was condemned, apd was permit-
ted to go to Cadiz, when the parole and
security were given as before men-
tioned.
This is the asylum—this the hospita-
lity which we received in the dominions
of Great Britain, when driven from Al-
giers by the Barbarian Dey.
; TOBIAS LEAR.
New-York, April 19, 1813
From the National Advocate.
YVe are indebted to the politeness of
captain Hess, of the ship Portia of Phi-
ladelphia, arrived'at this port, from Ca-
diz, for London papers to February
19th, from which we extract the fol-
lowing debate in the British Parlia-
ment. We regret that we have not
room for more than the sketches of two
Speeches in the House of Lords, those
in the Commons being the most inte-
resting.
BRITISH PARLIAMENT.
HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 18.
AMERICAN WAR.
Lord Holland, in a short speech, expressed
bis belief, that from the extreme meeRy of the
point on which tlie negociatioa broke 'off, it I
might not be altogether hopeless of renewal.
On the question of naturalization, there could
be no doubt that the king had a right to the
services of the natives of this country, and
that the flag of the merchant could not protect
them. But strong as were the demands of A-
meriea, we had made stronger in our day. He
accidently had taken up the Statute book on
the table, and found a Statute of Anne, enact-
ing, that any man, not merely who resided in
England, but in any other country, and took
the oaths of allegiance to the Queen, should be
considered as under English protection.
Lord Erskine agreed that the war which A-
merica was waging against us was a war of
passion, but it was a passion provoked by our
aggression. There were principles of honor
among nations, as there were among individu-
als ; and the party first aggrieved must not
be the first to succumb. He tho’t oun. govern-
ment had acted unwisely towards America : it
had spontaneously offered to repeal the orders
in council: would it not have been better to
have kept them suspended over that power,
till America was out of the situation to do us
harm ? As to the proposal respecting the im-
pressment of seamen, in his mind there was a
great difference between suspending a right,
and altogether giving it up. America did not
call upon us to give up this right, but to take
time to consider whether it might not be sus-
pended. As to the management of the war, be
would say, “ beware of entering into a quar-
rel, but being in it, bear it manfully.” He trust-
ed, and had no doubt, that if the war continu
ed, we should, in a short time, sweep from the
seas all the vessels of our new enemy.
HOUSE OF COMMONS.
WAR WITH AMERICA.
Lord Castef.reaoh trusted that in rising to
address the House, they would excuse him for
calling to their recollection the great impor-
tance of the present subject. The considera-
tion that would coine before the House was,
whether Ministers had so conducted the nego-
ciations and discussions with America, as that
now, under the present circumstances, their
conduct merited the approbation of Parlia-
ment. He apprehended, however, that it was
not the practice of Ministers in such cases, to
come down to Parliament to ask for a vote of
approbation in their own favor: it w s enough
to have discharged their duty to the best of
their means, and to be satisfied in their own
consciences; it would be great arrogance to
presume that they had merited the approba-
tion of Parliament; but it would be their gra-
tification to find that approbation consequent
on their conduct. The merits of their conduct
it was natural to leave to those who might think
them in error, and who might therefore, if
they pleased, move some proposition upon that
point. The information now laid before the
House was produced at the instance of others,
particularly an hon. gentleman (Mr. Whit-
bread) ; but though it did not call on Ministers
to justify themselves, yet the House would do
them the justice to say, that they had manifest-
ed no sort of reluctance in giving all the neces-
sary information. They had submitted the
whole state of the discussion to Parliament, and
though it was not the particular question be-
fore them, he should feel disposed, if called
upon in later stages of the debate, to answer
any inquiries that might be made respecting
the views and conduct of Ministers, though
that was not in the first instance necessary.—
Hi regretted that under the circumstances of
the war, the additional calamity of the hostili-
ties with America should have occurred. It
was an evil that the war should be extended,
but particularly so in this new direction, for he
knew of none in which it could happen with
less advantage to both parlies. These were
his feelings ; and he lamented the war in com-
mon with Parliament aryl the nation, notwith-
standing the right and justice of the grounds
on which we had been obliged to enter into it
It was, however, a consolation, that though
our sincere endeavors to prevent it had failed,
the justice and necessity of our measures were
so connected with our paramount interests,
that the feelings of the country must go along
with government, and form the best pledge of
vigor in conducting the war, and of obtaining
that peace which was its only object. The
Americans could no> be so deaf to reason, as
that our cause would not have its due weight
with them, and induce them to call on their go-
vernment for peace. His proposition would
be, to assuae the Regent that they were con-
fident of the justice of the war, and relied on
tne best exertions of the country. Many
parts of the question had already taken up the
time of Parliament, which had given its opinion
on the most important of them : he should
therefore look rather to the later stages of the
discussions. In showing the necessity of the
stand government had made, he felt confident
that those who had recommended negotiation
with America, if they found that she had pre-
sumed upon mere supposed opinions in her
favor, would be among the most forward to re-
sist her, and to maintain the rights and inter-
est of this country. America might soon see,
that anxious to be her friend, we were equally
determined not to surrender what was essenti-
al to our interests. He lamented, that in the
communication of the President to Congress,
and the report of the Minister of Foreign Re-
lations,* almost every ancient subject of griev-
ance, though settled by amicable treaty, and
even by explanation and atonement in some
cases, had been brought forward ; the tenden-
cy of which was to protract every ressonuble
hope of peace, by inflaming the public feeling.
This certainly was not the temper in which
America should have proposed an armistice.
The main points in the American declaration
were what concerned illegal blockades as they
called it, and the impressment of seamen, sub-
jects of his Majesty, from American merchant
siiips. The blockades might he said to have
been taken out of the argument, by the propo
sal of an armistice; but the principles were
contended for, so as to leave no clear road for
future settlement. Mr. Russell, though he did
not claim any preliminary admission, yet re-
quired an indemnity from us for. all captures
under the Orders in Council, as the effect of il-
legal blockades, and seemed particularly to al-
lude to that of 1806. America might have
given up this point afterwards, but she had
not shown ary disposition to be satisfied with
our forbearance, out had laid in her claim for
indemnity, and for our abandoning ertar rights at
a future period. The differences of opinion here
on the Orders in Council, arose rather upon
commercial expediency, than on the rights of
this country to throw back on the enemy the ef-
fects of his own injustice. He would wave
that subject at present; but must s ty, that no
relaxation of these orders proceeded from any
disposition to suffer our rights to be shaken.
Government was always anxious so to modify
the system, as to accommodate and conciliate
neutrals as mnch as possible, and to embark
America, if it could, in a proper feeling of the
conduct of France. Under all forms we dis-
tinctly maintained and preserved our rights.
He should ever defend the justice and necessi-
ty of the Ord rs in Council, both as against
France, and in the contemplation of sound po-
licy for the interests of the British empire.
The absence of the American market might
*IIe must mean the Committee of Foreign Rela-
tions.—American.
injure trade iu 3ome places ; but without the
orders, France would have been commercially
triumphant on the continent. He was an ad-
mirer of the system, in the spirit in which it ^
was conceived by the late Mr. Percival. It was
modified in 1809 as narrowly as possible, and
subsequontly, after the L uke of Bassano’s de-
claration. New efforts had been made respect-
ing the license system with similar views. In
fact, we had always relaxed our con-fact, when
doing so was not subversive of the plan for co-
ercing France to give up ber system. As to
the blockade of 1806, it remained for three
years uncomplained of; even the American
minister in London praised the policy of the go-
vernment who declared it. Its justice had been
since constantly maintained by succeeding ad-
ministrations. It was supported by an ade-
quate force, according to the ordinary laws of
nations, and rested on the truest principles of
maritime law. It Was due to Mr. Fox, who was
then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to say, that
he did not notify the blockade till he had writ-
ten to the Amiralty to know, whether they
could undertake strictly and properly to enforce
it. The character of the country in that block-
ade stood on grounds which neither Francs nor
America could shake. The next great point
made by the American government was on a
subject which we considered to be one of the
main pillars of our maritime strength—the
right of impressment. In the different over-
tures which the American government had
made upon this point, he thought the House
would not see any material difference. It would
not be unimportant, however, to observe the
comparative degree ofinterast which had been
set forward in so prominent a manner. He
could not avoid acknowiegiiig, that the subjects
of America, andtheorher neutral nations, must
have incidentally suffered by the exercise of
the rights of the belligerent powers. It was
natural for them to feel a strong desire to pro-
tect their subjects from every inconvenienc ■;
and if they had urged their claims with any
reasonable temper, he would by no means com-
plain of the earnestness which they manifested.
At the same time it must be recollected, that
the question to America wus only of conveni-
ence or inconvenience; whereas the question to
this country was one of vital importance, touch-
ing the manner in which our maritime strength
(upon which our security rested) had hitherto-
been upheld and maintained. The question,
therefore, with ns, was not a question of con-
venience or inconvenience, but a question re-
specting the conservation of the state. We
were, therefore, justified in viewing the suj^^
ject with very different feelings without beirJ^P
justly liable to the charge of taking a high
tone, and wi-rtiing to lord it over America as a
superior nation; He conceived, that the Ame-
rican government had acted in an unworthy
and discreditable manner, in taking a tone up-
on this subject not consistent with reason or
good sense, and which went so directly to
break that harmony between the two countries
which it would be so desirous to preserve. He
thought that no rational or fair man could say
that there was any thing in those papers which
shewed any desire on the part of his Majesty’s
government to do any thing unjust or oppres-
sive towards America. The American govern-
ment, however, had been pleased to assume*
that a very considerable number of American
seamen had been impressed on board our ships
of war; and they had made out their lists so
far as to calculate them at 20,0 0. In order to -
give any color to such a statement, they must
assume, in the first place, that every man taken
out of American ships was really an American
seamen. The statement, however, was nothing
like a true account. Although the whole nuim
ber employed in our fleets amounted to 145,000,
when the lords of admiralty, in January, 1811,
called upon those sailors who claimed to be
American, sea men, to declare themselves, there
were only 3500 who pretended to be American
s.eamen, and this year there were considerably
less. When the truth of their allegations was
examined, it did not appear that more than'a
fourth of those who claimed"-to be American
seamen, could support their claim in any man-
ner whatever. It was, indeed, reasonable to
expect, that in the hopes of getting their dis-
charge, many would have asserted themselves
to be American seamen who were not. Instead
of twenty thousand, it would therefore appear,
that sixteen or seventeen hundred was the
greatest number of American seamen which we.
could iiave in our navy. How could any ration-
al person really believe that this country would
goto war with America for the purpose of
keeping such a small number of American sea-
men in our fleet? When the American govern-
ment, however, set forward in such strong
colors the number of American seamen impress-
ed in our vessels, it was remarkable that all
the maritime states of America from which
those seamen must be supposed to be taken,
denied the evil to have existed in any material
degree, and disapproved of the war that was
undertaken on that pretence. It was the agri-
cultural states of the south, and the provinces
on the Mississippi, who joined the President
in ihis ground oi war: but the public feeling
of the maritime and commercial states of Ame-
rica was very evident from their not having
given a single vote for that President who made
the impressment of their seamen the great pre-
text ot war. (~Hear, Hear.J He believed that
it would be very evident, on the perusal of the.
papers, . that this government had acted
throughout in the spirit of conciliation and for-
bearance, but that no such dispositions were
manifested on the part of the American go-
vernment.
There were some who thought that since the
commencement ol the war the government had
not acted with sufficient vigor. This was a
question that he was prepared to discuss when-
ever it should regularly be brought forward.
He would confess that ministers did feel a spi-
rit of conciliation rather than of irritation, and
that they had hoped, even after the declaration
of war, that the American government might
be brought to something like a spirit of conci-
liation on hearing of the repeal of our Orders
in Couucil. He should, however, be prepared
to show, that if ministers did not immediately
send as great a force us many thought should
have immediately been sent against America, it
was because such a force could not then be
spared from other services. As to defensive
measures, it was evident that they hart adopted
sufficient measures for the defence of Canada,
and our possessions in that part of the world.
Neither had any of our valuable fleets been
'captured, as might have been expected in the
first eruption of the war, when the assailants
might choose their own time for commencing
it. All that they could be charged with on
this head, was not having immediately sent a
force strong enough to act offensively. Some
men expecied that this country was to be
equally strong by land and by sea, at all points
ot the world where a war might break out.
This was, however, not a rational supposition,
and he trusted that he could prove that minis-
ters had used every reasonable diligence to
meet this war, when it could no longer be a-
voided. There were some who thought that
the Order of Blockade had been too long de-
layed ; but it must be recollected, that many
of the American vessels were then bringing
supplies either to this country or to its allies,
and that therefore we might have been the suf-
ferers by such a measure. He thought it would
appear upon the whole of the papers submitted,
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National Intelligencer. (Washington City [D.C.]), Vol. 13, No. 1966, Ed. 1 Saturday, April 24, 1813, newspaper, April 24, 1813; Washington, District of Columbia. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth996021/m1/2/: accessed July 9, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; .