National Intelligencer. (Washington City [D.C.]), Vol. 13, No. 1926, Ed. 1 Saturday, January 23, 1813 Page: 2 of 4
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V"'
I s' all now procaed to the next view, f pro-
posed to tsk' on this project of invadbg Cam-
da, and consider it in the light of a means to
obtain an early and honorable peace- It is said,
and this is the w hole argument in favor of this
invasion, in this aspect, that the only way to
negociate successfully with Great Britain, is to
appeal to her fears and raise her terrors for
the fate of her colonies. I shall here say no-
thing concerning the difficulties of executing
this scheme; nor about the possibility of a
deficiency fifth in men and money. I will not
dwell on the disgust of all New England, nor
on the influence of this disgust with respect to
your efforts. I will admit for the present, that
an army may be raised, and that during the
first years it may be supported by loans, and
that afterwards it will support itself by bayo-
nets. I will admit farther, for the sake of ar-
gument, that success is possible and that Great
Britain realizes the practicability of it. Now,
all this being admitted, I maintain that the sur-
est of all possible ways to defeat any hope from
negociation, is the threat of such an invasion
and an active preparation to execute it. Those
must be very young polit icians,their pin-feathers
not yet grown, and however they may flutter on
this floor, they are not yet fledged for any high
or distant flight, who think that threats Sc ap-
pealing to fear are the ways of producing a dis-
position to negociate in Great Britain, or in any
other nation which understands what it owes
to its own safety and honor. No nation can
yield to' threat what it might yield to a sense
of interest; because, in that case, it has no
credit for what it grants, and what is more,'
loses something in point of reputation, from
the imbecility which concessions made under
such circumstances indicate- Of all nations in
the world, Great Britain is the last to yield to
considerations of fear and terror. The whole
history of the British nation is one tissue of
facts, tending to shew the spirit with which
she meets all attempts to bully and brow-beat
her into measures inconsistent with her inter
ests or her policy. No nation ever before made
such sacrifices of the present to the future.
No nation ever built her greatness more syste-
matically, on the principle of a haughty self-
respect, which yields nothing to suggestions of
danger, ard which never permits either her
abilitv or inclination to maintain her rights to
be suspected. In all negotiations, therefore,
with that power, it may be taken as a certain
truth, that your chance of failure is just in pro-
portion to the publicity and obtrusiveness of
threats and appeals to fear.
The American cabinet understand all this
very well, although this House may not. Their
policy is founded upon it. The project of this
bill is to put at a still further distance the
4hauce of amicable arrangement, in conse-
quence of the dispositions which the threat of
invasion of their colonies, and attempt to exe-
cute it will excite in the British nation and mi
nistry. I have some claim to speak concerning
the policy of the men who constiUBe the Ame-
rican cabinet. For eight years I have studied
their history, characters and interests. I know
no reasons why I should judge them severely,
except such as arise from those inevitable con
elusions, which avowed principles and distinct
conduct have impressed upon the mind. I say,
then, sir, without hesitation, that in my judg-
ment, theembanassments of our relations with
Great Britain, and keeping alive between this
country and that a root of bitterness has been,
is, and will continue to be, a main principle ot
the policy of this American cabinet. They want
hot * solid settlement of our diffe rences. If the
nation will support them in t, they will perse
vere in the present war. If it willnot, some gene-
ral arrangements will be the resort, which will
leave open opportunities for discord; which on
proper occasions will lie improved by them. I
shall give my reasons for this opinion. I wish
no sentiments of mine to hsve inflyrnce any
farther than \he reasons upon which they are
founded justify. They are public reasons, aris-
ing from undeniable facts; the nation will
judge for it self.
The men who now, and who, for these twelve
years past, have, to the misfortune of this
country, guided its councils and directed its
destini-s, came into power on a tide, which
w.'s raised and supported by elements consti-
tuted of British prejudices and British antipa-
thies. The parties which grew up in this na-
tion took their origin and form at the time of
the adoption of the treaty negociated by Mr.
Jay, in 1794. The opposition of that
dav, ot which the men now in power were
the leaders, availed themselves, very dex-
terously, of the relics of that hatred to-
wards the British name which remained af-
ter the revolutionary war. By perpetually
blowing upon the embers of the ancient pas-
sions, 'hey excited a fl.;me in the nation; and
by s\ srematically directing it against the
honorable men who at that time conducted its
affairs, the strength and influence of those
men were impaired. The embarrassments with
Fiance, which succeeded in .1798 and 1799,
were turned to the same account. Unfortunate-
ly, those who then conducted public affairs at-
tended less to the appeal ance of things, than to
their natures; and considered more what was
due to their country than was prudent, m the
state of the prejudices and jealousies of the
people, thus artfully excited against them.
They went on, in the course they deemed
right, regardless of personal consequences,
and blind to the evidenced of discontent which
surrounded them. The consequences are well
known. The supreme power ki these U. S.
passed into the hands which now possess it;
in which it has been continued down to the
present time. This transfer of power was ef-
fected,^ undeniably, principally on the very
ground of these pre udices and antipathies
which existed in the nation against Great-Bri-
ta n ; and which had been artfully fomented by
the men new in power and their adherents, and
directed against their predecessors. These
prejudices and passions consti ute the main
pillar of the power of these men. In my
opinion, they never will permit it to be wholly
taken away from them They never will per-
mit the people of this country to look at them
and their political opponents, free of that jaun-
dice with which they have carefully imbued the
vision of their own partizans. They never
will consent to be weighed in a balance of meie
merits; but will always take care to keep in re-
serve some portion of these British antipathies,to
throw as a make-weight into the opposite scaie,
whenever they find their own sinking. To con-
tinue, multiply, strengten and extend these
props of their power, has been and still is the
object of the daily study and the nightly vigils
of our American cabinet. For this the British
treaty was permitted to expire by its own lircii-
taf.cn; notwithstanding the state of things
which the treaty of Amiens had produced in
Europe was so little like permanent peace,
that the occurrence of the fact on which the
force of the limitation depended, might easily
have been questioned, with but little vio ence
to the terms, and in perfect conformity with
i'l spirit. For this a renewal of the treaty of
179i was refused by our cabinet, aitbo’ prof-
fered by the British government. For this the
trea1 y negociated. by Messrs. Monroe and
Pinkney in 1807 was rejected. For this, in
1311, fifty thousand dollars were paid out of
th , public treasury to John Henry, fur the ob
vious purpose of enabling the American cabinet
to calumniate their political opponents, on this
Tf-rv point of British influence, upon the ere of
elections, occurring in Massachusetts, on the
event of which the perpetuati >n of their own
power was materially dependant. Mr. Speaker,
such men as these, never will permit a state of
things to pass away, so essential to their influ-
ence. Be it peace or war, arrangement or hos-
tility, the association of these British antipa-
thies in the minds of the mass of the commtt-
nity, with the characters- of their political op-
ponents, constitutes tht*.* great magazine of
their power. This composes their whole puli
ticnl larder. It is, like Lord Peter’s brown
loaf, their “ beef, mutton, veal, venison, par-
tridge, plumb-puddiug and custard ”
From the time of the expiration of the Bri-
tish treaty of 1794, and the refusal to renew
it, the American cabinet have been careful to
precede negotiation with some circumstance
or other, calculated to make it fail, or at least
to mi ke a successful result less certain. Thus
in 1806, when, from the plunder of our com-
merce, by British cruizers, a negociation, nut-
withstanding the obvious reluctance of the ca-
binet, was forced upon them, by the clamours
of the merchants, the non-importation law of
April, in that year, was obtruded between the
two Countries. In the course of the debate up-
on that law, it was opposed upon this, very
ground, that it was an obstacle to a successful
negociation. It was advocated, like the bill,
now under discussion, "as an aid to successful
negociation. It was also said by the opponents
of that law of 1806, that G Britain would not
negociate, under its operation, and that ar-
rangement, attempted under proper auspices,
could not be difficult; from the known inter-
ests and inclinations of that nation. "What was
the consequence ? Precisely that which was
anticipated. The then President of the United
States was necessitated to come to this House,
and recommend a suspension of the operation
of that law upon the openly avowed ground of
its being expedient lo give that evidence of a
conciliatory disposition; really, because, if
permitted to continue in operation, negociation
was found to be impracticable. After the sus-
pension of that law, a treaty was formed. The
merits of that treaty, it is not within the scope
of my present argument to discuss. It is suffi-
cient to say, it was deemed good enough, to
receive the sanction of Messrs. Monroe and
Pinkney. It- arrive I in America, and was re-
jected by the authority of a single individual
apparently because of the insufficiency, of the
arrangement about impressment. Really, be-
cause a settlement with G. Britain, at that
time did tint “ enter into the scope of the po-
licy” of the, American cabinet. The negocia-
tion was indeed"renevtd, but it was followed
up with the enforcement of the non-importa-
tion law, and the enactment of the embargo.
Both which steps were slated at the time, as
they proved afterwards, t6 be of a nature to
make hopeless successful negociation
In this s'ate the Executive power of this na-
tion formally past into new hands, but sub-
stantially remained under the old principles
of action, and subject to the for mer influences,
it was desirable that a fund of popularity should
be acquired for the new administration. Ac-
cordingly an arrangement was made with Mr
Erskine, and no questions asked, concerning
the adequacy of his powers. But, les this
circumstance should hot defeat the proposed
arrangement, a clause was inserted in the cor-
respondence containing an insult to the British
government, offered in the face of the world,
such as no man ever gave to a private indivi-
dual whom he did not mean to offl-nd. Tiie
President of the U. States said, in so many
words, to the person at the head of that govern-
ment, that, he did not understand what belong-
ed to his own honor, as well . s it was under-
stood by *he President himself. The effect of
such language was natural, it was necessary ;
it could not but render the British government
averse to sanction Erskine’s arrangement The
effect was anticipated by Mr. Robert Siniui,
then actingas Secretary of Siate. He object-
ed to its being inserted, but it was done in the
President’s own hand writing. - As Mr. Ers-
kine’s authority was denied by the British go-
vernment, it is well kpown that, in fac«, on the
point of this indignity, the fate of that ar-
rangement turned. Can any one doubt that
our cabinet meant that it should have this ef-
fect ? I send you word, Mr. Speaker, that I
have agreed with your messenger, and wish
you to ratify it. I think you, however, no gen-
tleman, notwithstanding, and that you do not
understand, as well as I, what is “ due to
your own honor.” What think you, sir?
Would you ratify such an arrangement, if you
could help it? Does a proffer of settlement,
connected with such language, look like a dis-
position or an intention to conciliate ? ^ I appeal
to the common sense of mankind on the point.
The whole state of the relations, induced
between this country and G. Britain, in conse-
quence of our embargo and restrictive sys-
tems, was, in fact, a standing appeal to the
fears of the British cabinet. For, notwith-
standing those systems were equal in their
terms, so Iar as they affiteted foreign powers,
yet their ^operations was notoriously almost
wholly upon G. Britain. To yield to that pres-
sure, or do any thing which should foster, in
this country, the idea that it was an effectual
weapon of hostility, was nothing more than
conceding that she was dependent upon us. A
concession, which, when once made by her,
was cer'ain to encourage a resort to it by us on
every occasion of difficulty between the two
nations. Reasoning, therefore, upon the known
nature of things, and the plain interests of G.
Britain, it was foretold that, during its conti-
nuance, she would concede nothing. And the
event has justified those predictions. But, the
circumstance, the most striking, and that fur-
nishing the most conclusive evidence of the
indisposition of the American cabinet to peace,
and their determination to carry on the war, is
that connected with the pretended repeal of
the'French decrees, in Nov. 1810, and thecon-
sequeKt revival, in 1811, of our restrictive sys-
tem agatest G. Britain.
If ever a body of men were pledged to any
thing, the American cabinet, its friends and
supporters weiv pledged for the truth of this
fact, that the F.vnch decrees of Berlin and
Milan were definitively repealed as it respects
the U. States, on the first of Nov. 1810. If e-
ver any body of men staked their whole stock
of reputation upon any point, our cabinet did
it on ibis. They and their partizans asserted
and raved. They denounced every man as a
British partizan who denied it. They declared
the rest ielive system was revived by the mere
effect of the proclamation. But, lest the courts
of law should not be as subservient to their po-
licy as might be wished, they passed the law
of the 2d March, 1811, upon the basis of this
repeal, and of its being definitive. 'Ihe Bri-
tish government refused, however, to recog-
nise the validity of this repeal, and denied
t hat the Berlin and Milan decrees were repeal-
ed, on the 1st November, 1810, as our cabinet
asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument be-
tween the British Ministry and our cabinet.
The British Ministry admitted, that if the
Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed, on
> he 1st November, 1810, they were bound to
revoke their orders in council. But they deni-
ed that repeal to exist. Our cabinet,, on the
other hand, admitted, that if the Berlin and
Milan decrees were not repealed, on the 1st
November, 18 ;0, the restrictive system ought
not to have been revived against G. Britain,
But they asserted that repeal to exist. Tins
was. vieifttdly, the Mate of the question be
tween the two countries on this point. And it
is agreed, on all hands, that this refusal of the
British government, to repeal their orders in
Council, after the existence of the repeal of the
Berlin and Milan decrees, as asserted l»y the
American cabinet, wa9 the cause of the decla-
ration of war between the two countries. So
that, in truth, the question of the right of
war, depended upon the existence of that fact;
for if that fact did not exist, even the Ameri-
can cabinet did not pretend that, in the posi-
tion in which things then stood, they had a
right to declare war, on account of the conti-
nuance of the British orders in council.
Now, what is the truth in relation to this
all-important fact, the definitive repeal of the
Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st Nov. 1810;
the pivot upon which turned the revival of the
restrictive system and our declaration of war ?
Why, sir, the event has proved that in relation
to that fact the American cabinet was, to say
the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a
decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811, but not
promulgated till & year afterwards, distinctly
declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees
were not definitively repealed, as relates to the
XJ. S. on the 1st Nov. 1810. He also declares
that they are then, on that 28th of April, for
the first time repealed. And he founds the is-
suing of this decree on the act of the Ameri-
can Congress of the 2d of March, 1811. That
very act, which was passed upon the ground
of the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Mi-
lan decrees, on the 1st Nov. 1810 ; and which,
it is agreed on ill sides, the American govern-
ment were bound in honor not to pass, except
in case of such antecedent repeal.
Were ever a body of men so abandoned, in
the hour of need, as the American cabinet,
in this instance, by Bonaparte ? Was ever aity
body of men so cruelly wounded in the house
of their friend ? This, this “ was the unkind-
est cut of all.” But how was it received by
the American cabinet ? Surely they were in-
dignant at this treatment. Surely the air
rings with reproaches upon a man who has
thus made them stake their reputation upon a
falshood ; and then gives lit tie less than the
fie direct, to their assertions. No, sir, nothing
of all this is heard from our cabinet. There
is a philosophic tameness that would be re-
markabh, if it were not, in all cases, affect,
ing Bonaparte, characteristic" All the execu-
tive of the U. States has found it in his heart
to say, in relation to this last decree of Bona-
parte, which contradicts his previous allega-
tions and asseverations, is that, “This pro-
ceeding is rendered by the time and manner
of it, liable to many objections !” '
I have referred to this subject as being con-
nected with futuro conduct, strikingly illustra-
tive of the disposition of the American cabi-
net to carry on the war, and of their intention,
if possible, not to make peace. Surely, if any
nation had a claim for liberal treatment from
another, it Was the British nation from the A-
merican, after the discovery of the error of the
American government, in relation to the repeal
of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November
1810. In consequence of that error, the Ame
rican^cabinet had ruined numbers of our own
citizens, who had been caught by the revival of
the non-intercourse law; they had revived that
law against G. Britain, under circumstances,
which now appeared to have been fallacious; &
they had declared war against her, on the sup-
position, that site had refused to repeal her or-
ders in council, after the French decrees were in
fact revoked ; whereas, it now appears that
they were in fact not revoked Surely the
knowledge of this error was followed by an in-
stant and anxious desi e to redress the result-
ing injury. As the British orders in council
were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of the
existence of the French decree of repeal, surely
the American cabinet at once extended the
liand of* mat fhp tteltioK- **°F*n-
ment half way; stopped all further irritation ;
and strove to place every thing on a basis, best
suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No,
sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the con-
trary, the question of impressments is made the
basis of continuing tlje war. On this subject,
a studied fairness' of proposition is preserved,
accompanied with systematic perseverance in
measures of hostility.’ An armistice was pro-
posed by them. It was refused by us. It was
cceded to by the American general on the
frontiers. It was rejected by the cabinet.. No
consideration of the false allegation on which
the war in fact was founded ; no consideration
of the critical and extremely consequential na-
ture to both nations of the subject of impress-
ment ; no considerations of humanity, inter-
posed their influence. They renewed hostili-
ties. They rushed upon Canada. Nothing
would satisfy them but blood. The language
of their conduct is that of the giant, in the le;
gends of infancy—
Fee, fate, foiu, lum,
I smell the blood of an Englishman,
Dead or alive, I inill have some !
Can such men pretend that peace is their
object ? Whatever may result, the perfect con-
viction of my mind is that they have no such
intention, and that if it* come it is contrary both
to their hope and expectation.
I would not judge these men severely. But
it is tny duty to endeavor to judge them truly-;
and to express fearlessly the result of that judg-
ment, w hatever it may be. My opinion re-
sults from the application of the well known
principle of judging concerning men’s purposes
jtnd motives :—To consider rather what men
do, than what they say ; and to examine their
deeds in connection with predominating pas-
sions and interests ; and on this basis decide.
In making an estimate of the in'entions of these
or any other politicals, I make little or no
account of pacific pretensions. There i3 a
general reluctance at. War, and desire of peace,
which pervades the gifeat mass of every peo-
ple; and artful rulers could never keep any
nation ai war any lengjp of time, beyond their
true interests, without some sacrifice to that
general love of peace which exists in civiliz-
ed men. Bonaparte himself will tell you that
he is the most pacific creature in the world.
He has already declared, by his proclamation
to Frenchmen, that he has gone to Moscow
for no other end than to cultivate peace, and
counteract the emperor of Russia’s desire of
war. In this country*, where the popular sen-
timent has so strong a? impulse on its affairs,
the same obtrusive prehension must inevitably
be preserved. No man or set of men ever can
dr will get this conntryl tit war, or continue it
long in war, without keeping on hand a stout,
round stock of gulling matter. Fair proposi-
tions will always be made to go hand in hand
with offensive acts. Add when something is
offered so reasonable* that no man can doubt
but it will be accepted] at the same moment
something will ha done of a nature to embar-
rass the project, and iljnot to defeat at least to
render its acceptance dubious. How this has
been in past lime, I have shewn. I will now
illustrate what is doing and intended at pre-
As from the uniform tenor of the conduct ot
the American cabinet, ihi relation to the British
government, I have no lielict that their inten-
tion has been to make a solid arrangement
with that nation; so, ffom the evidence ot
their disposition and intention existing abroad
and on the table, 1 have ho belief that sucli is
at present their purpose. I cannot possibly
think otherwise?, than that such is not their
intention. Let ua take the ease into common
life. I have demands, Mr. Speaker, against
you, very just in their nature, but different.
Some of recent, others of very old date. The
former depending upon principles very clearly
in my favor. The latter critical, difficult and
dubious, both in principle and settlement. In
this state of things and during, your absence,
I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw
myself upon jour children and servants and
property, which happen to be in my neighbor
hood ; and do them all the injury I can. While
I am doing this, I receive a messenger from
you, stating that the grounds of the recent in-
jury are settled; that you comply fully with
my terms. Your servants and children, whom
I am plundering and killing, invite me to stay
my hand until you return, or until some accom-
modation can take place between us. But,
deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my
intention of injury to the utmost. When there
is reason to expect your return, I multiply my
means of injury and offence. And no sooner
do I hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist
into your face, and say to you-—“ Well, sir,
here are fajr propositions of settlement—Come;
to my terms, which are very just—Settle the
old demand in my way, and we will be as good
friends as ever.” Mr. Speaker, what would
be your conduct on such an occasion ? Would
you be apt to look as much at the nature of
the propositions, as at the temper of the as-
sailant ? If you did not at once return blow
for blow, and injury for injury*, would you not
at least take a little time to consider ? Would
you not tell such an assailant, that you were
not to be bullied nor beaten into any conces-
sion f If you settled at all, might you not
consider it your duty in some way to make him
feel the consequences of his strange intemper-
ance of passion ? For myself, I have no ques-
tion how a man of spirit ought to act under
such circumstances. I hkve a3 little, how a
great nation, like G. Britain, will act. Now
I have no doubt, sir, that the American cabi-
net view this subject in the same light. They
understand well, that by the declaration of war,
the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an ar-
mistice, and perseverance in hostilities, after
the principal ground of war had been removed,
they have wrought the minds of the British ca-
binet and people to a very high state of irrita-
tion. Now is the very moment to get up some
grand scheme ol pacification; such as may per-
suade the American people of the inveterate
love of our cabinet for peace, and make them
acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities.
Accordingly, before the end of the session, a
great tub will he thrown out to the whale.
Probably a little while before the Spring elec-
tions terms of very fair import will be prof-
fered to G. B. Such as perhaps six months
ago our cabinet would not have granted, had
she solicited them on her knees. Such as pro-
bably in the opinion of the people of this coun-
try, G. B. ought to accept; such perhaps as
in any other state of things, she would have
accepted. Bat such, as I fear, Under the irri-
tation produced by the strange course pursued
by the American cabinet, that nation will not
accept Sir, I do not believe that our cabinet
expect that they will be accepted. They think
the present state of induced passion is suffici-
ent to prevent arrangement. But to make as-
surance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate,
that arrangement shall not happen, they pre-
pare this bill. A bill, which proposes an aug-
mentation of the army for the express purpose
of conquering the Canadas. A bill which, con-
nected with the recent disposition evinced by
our cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and
with the avowed intent of making their subju-
gation the means of peace, through th»Jb*v to
be inspired into G. B. is as offensive to the
pride of that nation as can well be imagined ;
and is, in my apprehension, as sure a guarantee
of continued war as could be given. On these
grroonAs, jj»y mind cannot force itself to any
Other Conclusion *»•»« «'»•» .>•»> .V>i.
object of this bill is the true om»; that the Ca-
nadns are to be invaded the next season ; that
the war is to be protracted ; and that this is the
real policy of the x\merican cabinet.
I will now reply to those invitations to
“union,” which have been goobstrusivelv urg-
ed upon us. If by this call to.union is meant
an union in a project for the invasion of Cana-
da or for the invasion of East Florida, or for
the conquest of any foreign country whatever,
either as a means of carrying on this war or
for any other purpose, I answer*distinctly ; I
will unite with ne man nor any body of men
for any such purposes. I think sueh projects
criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to
the prosperity of these states. But, if by this
invitation is meant union in preparation for de-
fence, strictly so called; union in fortifying
and by which they are prevented froin listening
to what is true and receiving what is reasona-
ble. „ >
Mr. Speaker, it well becomes any man stand-
ing in the presence- of such a nation as this, to
speak of himself seldom ; and such a man as I '
am, it becomes to speak of himself not at all;
except indeed when the relations in which he
stands to Iris country are little .known Si when
the assertion of those relations has some con-
nexion, and may have some.inftueijce on inter-
ests which it is peculiarly, incumbent upon
him to support.
Under this sanction I say, it is not for a man
whose ancestors have been planted in tills
country now for almost two centuries; it is
not for a man who has a family and friends and
character and children and a deep stake in the
soil; it is not for a man ^vho is se f-conttcious
of being rooted in that soil as deeply and as ex-
clusivel} as the oak which shoots among its
rocks; it is not for such a man to hesitate or
swerve a hair’s breadth from his country’s
purpose and true interests, because of file
yelpings, the howliiigs, and snarlings of that
hungry pack which corrupt men keep directly
or indirectly in pay, with the view of hunting
down every man who dare developc their pur-
poses ; a pack composed it is true of some na-
tive curs, but for the most part of hounds and
spaniels of very recent importation, whose backs
■•re seared by the lash, and whose necks are
sore with the collars of their former masters.
In fulfilling his duty, the lover of his country
must- often be obliged to breast the shock of
calumny. If called to that service he will meet
the exigency with the same firmness, as should
smith r occasion call, he would breast the
shock of battle. No, sir, I am not to he deter-
red by such apprehensions. May heaven so
deal with me and mine, as I am true or faith-
less to the best interests of this people ! May
it deal with me according to its just judgments
when I fail to bring men and measures to the
bar ofpubiic opinion, and to expose projects
and systems of policy which I realize,to be ruin-
ous to the peace, prosperity and liberties of
my country !
This'leads me naturally to the third a'.dlas.
point of view, at which 1 proposed to consider
tiiis bill, as a means for. the advancement of ,he
objects of the personal or local ambition of the.
members of the American cabin t. With respect'
to the members of that cabinet, I may almost
literally say 1 know nothing of them except as
public men. Against them I have no personal
animosity. I know little of them in private
life, and that little never made me ambitious
lo know more. I look at them as public men
wielding powers and putting in operation means
and instruments, materially affecting the inter-
ests and prospects of the Uf. States.
It is a curious fact, but no less true than, cu-
rious, that for these twelve years past the whole
affairs of this country have been managed and*
its fortunes reversed, under the influence of a
cabinet little less than despotic, compo»fS, to
all efficient purposes, of two Virginians and a
fore gner. When 1 speak, of these men as Vir-
ginians, I mean to cast no odium upon that
state, us though it were not entitled to its
full share of influence in the national councils s
nor when I refer to one of them as being a
foreigner, do I intend thereby to suggest any
connexions of a nature unworthy or*suspicio^
i refer to these circumstances as genegt^
undoubted.facts which belong to the;-jd t
of the cabinet, and which cstm*- t \° ^
into view in all esUri^W5
pq i,.ntr as man U -ortstBir.ed as he is, and so
loiur af tb- r-vt-judices and principles of child-
hood -aever fail to influence in different degrees,
u> even the best men, the course of thinking
and action of their riper years.
l might have said perhaps with strict pro-
priety, that it was.acaoiwet composed or three
Virginians and a foreigner; because once in
the course o&Uie twelve years there has been a
change of one of Uie enaracters. But, si-, that
change was notoriously matter of form rather
than substance. As it respects the cabinet,
the principles continued the same; the inter-
ests the same ; the .objects at which it aimed,
the same.
1 said that this cabinet had been during these
twelve years lutie less than despotic. This
fact also is notorious. During this whole peri-
od the measures distinctly recommended have
been adopted by the two Houses of Congress,
wi h as much uniformity and with as iitile mo-
dification, too, as the measures of die British
ministry have been adopted during the same
period by the British parliament. The connec-
tion between cabinet c..unciis and parliamenta-
ry acts is Justus intimate in the one country as
in the other.
I said that these three men constituted to all
our seaboard ; union in putting our cities into effi— ^ ^ SSS
a state of safety; union m raising such a mil.- n0L0I.^u/ lt is lme that duri lhis iod ,
oH- individuals have been called ini the
militia in the hand of the constitutional leaders,
the executives of the states, to give a rational
degree of security against any invasion; suffi-
cient to defend odr frontiers, sufficient to awe
into silence the Indian tribes within our terri-
tories ; union in creating sucli a maritime
force as shall command the seas on the Ameri
can coasts, and keep open the intercourse at
least between the states; if this is meant, I
have no hesitation ; union on such principles
you shall have from me cordially ard faithfu ly.
And this too, sir, without any reference to the
state of my opinion, in relation to the justice or
necessity of this war. Because I well under-
stand such to be the condition of man in a so-
cial compact, that he must par ake of the fate
of the society to which he belongs, and must
submit to the privations and sacrifices its de-
fence requires, notwithstanding these maybe the
result >f the vices or crimes of its immediate ru-
lers. But there is a great difference between sup
lers. uui mere ' ^ ""{{• extended, And its .Merest* so complicated, it is
porting such rulers in plans but those who would conduct Usaf-
defence, on which the safety of our ajtars and
firesides essentially depends, and supporting
them in projects of foreign invasion, and en-
couraging them in schemes, of conquest and
ambition which are not only unjust in them-
selves, but dreadful in their consequences; in-
asmuch as, let the particular project result as
it may, the general effect must be, according
to hummi view,, destructive to our own domes-
tic liberties and constitution. I speak as an
individual, sir, for my single self, did I sup.
port such projects, as are avowed to he the ob-
jects of this bill, I should deem myself a trai-
tor to my country. Were I even to aid them
by loan or in any other way, I should consider
myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose.
But when these projects of invasion shall be
abandoned; when men yield up schemes which
not only openly contemplate the raising of a
great military force, but also the concentrating
tlierti at one point and placing them in one
hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the fates
of a free republic; as llu y comprehend the
means by which such have ever heretofore been
destroyed; when I say such schemes shall be
abandoned, and the wishes of the cabinet lim-
ited to mere defence and frontier and maritime
protection, there will be r.o need of calls to
union. For such objects there is not, there
cannot be but one heart and soul in this peopl .
I know, Mr. Spe lter, that while I utter these
things a thousand tongues and a thousand
pens ure preparing* without doors to overwhelm
me ifpossible by their pestiferous gall. Already
I- hear »h (he air the sound of “ traitor'’—
l*‘jBfit!sh iigent”—“British gold—and all
those ’ohanjjfi.3 of-Vulgar catumuy, by which the
imaginations of the muss of men are riibctuJ,
eabinet. But they were ail of them compara-
tively minor men, sucli as had no great weight
either of personal talents or of personal influ-
ence to support them. They were kept as in-
struments ot tiie master spirits. And when
they failed to answer the purpose or became
restive, they were sacrificed or provided for.
The shades were made to play upon the curtain.
They entered. They bowed to tiie audience.
They did what they were bidden. They said
what was set down for them. When those
who pulled the wires saw fii, they passed.a way.
No man knew why they entered. NX man
knew why they departed. No man could tell
whence they came. No man asked whither
they were gone.
From this uniform composition of the cabi-
net, it is obvious that the project of file master
spirits was that of essential influence within
the cabinet. For in such a country *as ours, so
mpossibie but those who would conduct its'af-
fairs wisely, and with a 3ingle eye t» die pub-
lic good, should strive to call around themselves
the highest and most independent talents in the
nation, at least of their own j>ohlical friends.
When this is not the case, it must be apparent
that the leading influences want not associates,
bat instruments. The same principle applies
to the distribution of office out of the cabinet,
as to filling places within it. Some mistakes
may be expected to happen in selections among
candidates for appointments at a distance; but if
at any tune a cabinet shall be systematically gui-
ded in such selection by a regard not to merit or
qualifications, but to electioneering services ; if
the obvious design be to reward partizans 8c en-
courage defection to its party standard, then
the people may rest assured that the project
such cabinet has in view is not to serve the pub-
lic interest, but to secure their personal influ-
ence ; and that they* want nut competency for
the employment, but subserviency in it. How
this matter is, I shall not assert; not because
I have not very distinct opinions upon the sub-
ject, but because the, sphere of appointment is
too extensive to be comprehended in the grasp
of a single individual; and I mean to make no
assertion concerning motive or conduct,' of
which there does not exist in my mind evi-
dence as well complete as conclusive. I refer
to this subject, therefore, only as a collateral
and corroborative proof of the purposes of the
cabinet. Evely man can decide for himself, in
his own circle or neighborhood, concerning the
apparent principle upon which the cabinet have C
proceeded in making appointments ; remenr.- •
bering, always, the section of country against
whose prosperity the policy cf the eabinet is
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National Intelligencer. (Washington City [D.C.]), Vol. 13, No. 1926, Ed. 1 Saturday, January 23, 1813, newspaper, January 23, 1813; Washington, District of Columbia. (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth996093/m1/2/?q=%22%22~1: accessed July 17, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu.; .